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A LITERALIST PROPOSES FOUR MODEST REVISIONS TO
U.C.C. ARTICLE 3
Timothy R. Zinnecker*
I. INTRODUCTION
I first taught a Payment Systems class during the fall of
1994. Not having taken the course in law school,1 and bringing
very little "real world" experience in this area of commercial
law to the classroom, I approached the task of teaching the
course with some degree of fear and trepidation.2 I had already
taught Secured Transactions,3 so I was familiar with the
challenges of teaching a statutory course to a reluctant audi-
ence scarred by horror stories of their predecessors. I also au-
dited a Payment Systems course taught by a colleague during
the summer, so I had a good start on my lesson plans when the
class of thirty-four students first met on a Monday morning in
August.4 The students were patient, forgiving, and kind.5 Some
* Associate Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law of Texas A&M Uni-
versity. B.S.BA-, 1981, Central Missouri State University, J.D., 1986, Brigham Young
University. John L Barnes, F. Walter Bistline, Jr., William P. Bowes, Jr., W. David
East, Jennifer L Johnson, Douglas S. Miller, Daryl B. Robertson, Dulcie Green Wink,
and John J. Worley offered many insightful comments on the initial draft. My em-
ployer graciously provided me with a research stipend to write this article. I hope the
Dean doesn't demand a refund after he reads it.
1. When I was a law student, the course was known as "Commercial Paper."
One author has suggested that the moniker was selected in "an attempt to avoid
confusion because zoning lawyers helped draft Article 3 and they were looking to
distinguish commercial paper from residential and industrial paper." Marianne M.
Jennings, I Want to Know What Bearer Paper Is and I Want to Meet a Holder in
Due Course: Reflections on Instruction in UCC Articles Three and Four, 1992 BYU L.
REV. 385, 385 n.1.
2. But because I knew my performance would not affect my GPA, the degree of
fear and trepidation did not quite match that of the students.
3. Popularly referred to in the student lounge as "Sadistic Transactions."
4. I am thankful we did not meet at 8:00 am. So were the students. Commer-
cial law giant Karl Llewellyn and his initial proteges were not so fortunate. See K.N.
Llewellyn, Meet Negotiable Instruments, 44 CoLum- L. REV. 299, 299 (1944) (The first
law course I had a chance to teach was Bills and Notes [which met] three times a
64 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:63
even asked insightful and thought-provoking questions.6 To-
gether, we survived.
I must have performed adequately because those in positions
of power have asked me to teach the course almost every subse-
quent semester,7 and by now I have developed a rather de-
tailed syllabus. Students can expect to spend about a week
examining credit card issues,8 another week discussing consum-
er electronic funds transfer concerns, 9 and a third week learn-
ing the basics of a letter of credit transaction and a
nonconsumer funds transfer.0 For most of the semester, how-
ever, our time together is spent strolling" through various
provisions of Article 3 and (to a lesser extent) Article 4 of the
Uniform Commercial Code.
One scholar has described Article 3 as "a huge machine as-
sembled by a mad inventor and comprised of assorted sprock-
ets, gears, levers, pulleys, and belts."' Having kicked its tires,
changed its oil, pulled its levers, and otherwise operated it on
several semester-long trips, I have concluded that Article 3 per-
week at 8 A.M.").
5. But they did criticize me for using a text that did not follow Gilbert's on
Commercial Law very well.
6. For example, 'Will that be on the final exam."
7. Usually, my other course is Secured Transactions (and being assigned the
task of teaching the two most feared (loathed?) courses in law school probably ex-
plains why I am never in the running for "Professor of the Year"). One semester the
administration allowed me to teach a course in banking law. Knowing that using
"regulatory" or "FIRREA" or "usury" in the course description would repel prospective
enrollees, I used the following one-sentence enticement: "Learn how to reduce mort-
gage payments through arson." The registrar closed enrollment at 85. The next time
I teach the course I intend to borrow the course description proposed by my friend,
mentor, and BYU law professor Jim Gordon: "Discover why banks throw billions of
dollars away, but keep those 98-cent pens chained to their desks." James D. Gordon
I, How Not to Succeed in Law School, 100 YALE L.J. 1679, 1696 (1991). Normally, I
hesitate to cite an article from a journal that consistently declines to publish my
work, but rm hoping that Jim notices my kind acknowledgement and retroactively
raises my Conflicts grade a notch or two.
8. For example, we discuss whether Visa or American Express airs better televi-
sion commercials.
9. We examine why banks offer braille screen messages at drive-through ATMs.
10. Several students are aghast when they discover that the CHIPS network, a
major wire transfer system, is not owned and operated by Erik Estrada.
11. One former student who commented on selected passages of this article sug-
gested that "slogging" or "trudging" would be more accurate.
12. James J. White, Some Petty Complaints About Article Three, 65 MICa. L. REV.
1315, 1315 (1967).
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forms rather well. With some fine tuning, however, four parts
could function more efficiently."3 As identified by serial num-
ber, the parts are section 1-201(20) (the definition of "hold-
er"), 4 section 3-201 (the description of "negotiation), 5 section
3-310 (the ability to enforce the underlying obligation after
taking an instrument), and section 3-416(aXl) (the transfer
warranty of enforcement). 7 Mindful that it would be cowardly
of me to disparage the extraordinary drafting efforts of others
much more experienced than I in commercial matters without
also offering suggestions for improvement, each section con-
cludes with proposed modifications for the design of a "new and
improved" model.
11. TINKERING WITH THE DEFINITION OF "HOLDER"
One of the most frequently-used terms in Article 3 is "hold-
er. " 8 As one would expect, the importance of the term paral-
lels its frequency. For example, Article 3 applies only to "nego-
tiable instruments,"'9 a term that requires a writing to be pay-
able to bearer or to order when it is issued or initially pos-
sessed by a holder.' Furthermore, an instrument is not "nego-
tiated" between parties (a recurring concept in Article 3)Y un-
13. Throughout the article I refer to applicable U.C.C. provisions as "§ . " For
the most part, section references are to provisions currently in effect The two spon-
sors of the Uniform Commercial Code, the American Law Institute and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, rewrote Articles 3 and 4 in
1990. I refer to provisions in effect prior to the revisions as "pre-revised § _" The
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law was the forerunner of Article 3. I refer to provi-
sions of that law as "NEL § .
14. U.C.C. § 1-201(20).
15. § 3-201.
16. § 3-310.
17. § 3-416(aX1).
18. See §§ 3-104(aXl), 3-104(aX3Xii), 3-104(d), 3-105(a), 3-106(c), 3-106(d), 3-
108(aXi), 3-108(bXiii), 3-110(c), 3-113(b), 3-201(a), 3-201(b), 3-203(c), 3-204(c), 3-204(d),
3-205(a), 3-205(b), 3-205(c), 3-205(d), 3-207, 3-301(1), 3-302(a), 3-404(bXl), 3-409(c), 3-
410(a), 3410(c), 3-412, and 3-414(b). The term, with the same meaning, also appears
in Article 4. See §§ 4-201(b), 4-205(1), 4-401(d), 4-407(2), and 4-407(3).
19. See § 3-102(a).
20. See § 3-104(aX1).
21. See, e.g., §§ 3-110(d), 3-202(a), 3-202(b), 3-203(b), 3-203(c), 3-203(d), 3-204(a), 3-
205(a), 3-205(b), 3-205(d), 3-206(a), 3-207, 3-302(aXl), 3-306, 3-310(bX3), 3-404(b), 3-
413(b), and 3-420(a).
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less the instrument is transferred by a nonissuer to a holder.2
Additionally, a party must fall into one of three discrete catego-
ries before qualifying as a "person entitled to enforce" a nego-
tiable instrument (a phrase referenced throughout Article 3); 3
one category includes holders.' Perhaps most importantly, a
paity cannot be a "holder in due course" (a term used repeated-
ly in Article 3),' and thus enforce an instrument free and
clear of almost all claims and defenses of any party,' unless it
is the holder of the instrument.'
"Holder" is not defined in Article 3; its definition is found in
the "general definitions" section of Article 1.' Section 1-
22. See § 3-201(a).
23. See, e.g., §§ 3-104(e), 3-111, 3-116(c), 3-117, 3-302(e), 3-305(aX2), 3-305(c), 3-
305(d), 3-309(a), 3-310(bX3), 3-312(b)(2), 3-312(bX4), 3411(c), 3412, 3413(a), 3-414(b),
3-414(f), 3415(a), 3-416(aX1), 3-417(aX1), 3-417(dXl), 3418(d), 3-419(d), 3-420(a), 3-
420(c), 3-501(a), 3-602(a), 3-602(bX1), 3-603(a), 3-603(b), 3-603(c), 3-604(a), 3-604(c), 3-
604(d), 3-605(e), 3-605(f), and 3-605(h). The phrase also is found in Article 4. See §§
4-104(c), 4-207(aX1), 4-208(a)(1), and 4-208(d).
Students often use the acronym "PETE" when referring to this phrase. Students
are not alone. See Neil Littlefield & Kathleen Patchel, Payments-Articles 3, 4 and
4A and Related Areas of Federal Law, 50 Bus. LAw. 1493, 1497 (1993) (adopting the
acronym).
24. See § 3-301(i).
25. See, e.g., §§ 3-106(d), 3-202(b), 3-203(b), 3-206(e), 3-305(b), 3-305(c), 3-306, 3-
308(b), 3-312(c), 3-402(bX2), 3-413(b), and 3-601(b). The term also is found in three
other U.C.C. Articles. See, e.g., §§ 4-104(c), 4-205(1), 4-211, 4-407(1), 5-103(3), 5-
114(2Xa), 9-105(3), 9-206(1), and 9-309.
26. See § 3-305(b) (stating that a holder in due course may enforce an instrument
free and clear of most claims and defenses, other than the so-called "real defenses" in
clause (aX1)).
27. See § 3-302(a) (requiring a "holder in due course" to first be a "holder"); see
also Adams v. Madison Realty & Dev., Inc., 853 F.2d 163, 166 (3rd Cir. 1988) ("But
preliminarily, a person seeking to become a holder in due course must satisfy the
threshold requirements for becoming a 'holder,' the critical issue on this appeal.");
United States v. Kellerman, 729 F.2d 281, 284 (4th Cir. 1984) ("Obviously only a
holder can be a holder in due course."); Douglas J. Whaley, Forged Indorsements and
the UCC's 'Holder," 6 IIND. L. REV. 45, 55 (1972) ("[Bleing a holder is obviously a
sine qua non of holder in due course status .... ).
One author has suggested that the definition of "holder in due course" in sec-
tion 3-302 is "arguably the most important definition7 in Article 3. See Daryl B. Rob-
ertson, Report of the Commercial Code Committee of the Section of Business Law of
the State Bar of Texas on Revised UCC Articles 3 and 4, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 425, 461
(1995).
28. Terms used throughout the U.C.C. have the meaning ascribed to them in
section 1-201, unless the context otherwise requires or the term also is defined in one
of the other Articles. See § 1-201 (Preamble). One term used in Article 3 that uses
an Article 3 definition different from the generic Article 1 definition is "good faith."
Compare § 3-103(a)(4) (defining "good faith" as "honesty in fact and the observance of
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201(20) provides that a "holder" of a negotiable instrument is
"the person in possession if the. instrument is payable to bearer
or, in the case of an instrument payable to an identified person,
the identified person is in possession.'m At a minimum, a par-
ty must possess the instrument to be a holder."o Whether pos-
session alone is sufficient, however, depends on whether the
instrument is payable to bearer or to a specified person.
The following example illustrates the difference. Bradford
Corp. executes a promissory note to evidence a $100,000 loan
from Fidelity Bank. If the note identifies the payee in any of
the following ways, it is payable to bearer:
pay to bearer,"
pay to the order of bearer;-,
pay to ;
pay to CASH;4
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing") with § 1-201(19) (defining "good
faith" as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned).
29. § 1-201(20). The definition is incorporated into Article 3 through section 3-
103(d). My high school English teacher, Enid Farkis, would have a struggle diagram-
ming the definition. Miss Farkis is not alone. As the authors of one text have ob-
served, 'The drafter of the definition seems to have slipped off the grammatical path
in the middle of the sentence." PETER A. ALCES & MARION W. BENFIELD, JR., CASES,
PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON PAYMENT SYSTEMS 51 (1993); see also Gregory E.
Magge, Determining the Rights and Liabilities of the Remitter of a Negotiable Instru-
ment: A Theory Applied to Some Unsettled Questions, 36 B.C. L. REV. 619, 647 (1995)
([The definition of holder appears incomplete as written.").
30. "The term 'possession! is never defined, but in context it is quite clear that it
is intended to mean physical custody by the holder, or her agent" Jeanne L
Schroeder, Death and Transfiguration: The Myth that the U.C.C. Killed roperty,' 69
TEMP. L. REV. 1281, 1341 n.171 (1996); see also 2 JAMES J. WMTE & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 17-3, at 152 (4th ed. 1995 [Practitioner's
Edition]) ("The ambiguity in the word 'possession! has caused little trouble. With rare
exceptions, those claiming to be holders seem to have had physical possession of the
instrument in question.")
31. See § 3-109(aXl).
32. See id. One author suggests that a check made payable to the order of bearer
is likely to elicit one of the following teller responses:
(a) "Could I see some ID, Mr. Bearer?"
(b) "Why didn't they put your first name on here?"
(c) "Is your first name Smokey?"
(d) 'This looks illegal."
Jennings, supra note 1, at 396.
33. See § 3-109(aX2).
34. See § 3-1O9(aX3).
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pay to the order of CASH; 5 or
pay to the order of Fidelity Bank or bearer.5
Anyone (including not only Fidelity Bank, but also a thief or
finder) who possesses the note styled in any of the foregoing
manners is a holder of the note. However, if the note states
that it is payable to (i) the order of Fidelity Bank or (ii) Fideli-
ty Bank or order, then it is not payable to bearer. Instead, it is
payable to order and the identified person: Fidelity Bank." As
a general rule, absent the identified person's indorsement, no
other possessor can be a holder of such an instrument."
At first glance, the analysis does not seem too difficult. But
consider the following classroom hypothetical. Son ("X) executes
a promissory note payable to the order of his father. The father
gives the note, unindorsed, to another son ("Y"). Upon Y's
death, the note passes unindorsed to Y's wife ("Z"). This hy-
pothetical is loosely based on Smathers v. Smathers,ss a case
in which the appellate court held that the wife was not a hold-
er because the notes "were not drawn, issued or indorsed to her
or to her order or to bearer or in blank.' ° Students generally
have no trouble with the court's analysis. However, as most
professors enjoy doing,41 I tweak the facts and ask whether
the following change impacts the court's analysis. Suppose that
before he died, Y delivered the note to Z after indorsing the
back of the note as follows: "Pay to Z. Y." Is Z, now in posses-
sion of the note, a holder?
Many students are convinced that with this one factual
change Z has become a holder. And mindful of our class man-
35. See id. In this and the preceding example, rm using "CASH" in a monetary
context rather than as a reference to one of this country's greatest singing legends,
Johnny Cash (whose song, "Ring of Fire," has never been as popular at funerals as it
deserves to be).
36. See § 3-109 cmt. 2 ('An instrument that purports to be payable both to order
and bearer states contradictory terms. A transferee of the instrument should be able
to rely on the bearer term and acquire rights as a holder without obtaining the in-
dorsement of the identified payee.").
37. See § 3-109(b).
38. There exists an exception applicable to checks. See § 4-205 (permitting a de-
positary bank to be a holder of an unindorsed check deposited by a holder).
39. 239 S.E.2d 637 (N.C. App. 1977).
40. Id. at 638.
41. With fiendish glee!
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tra, "the Code is my friend," the students rely on a most au-
thoritative source, section 1-201(20). Indeed, Z seems to satisfy
the literal language of the definition of "holder": she is in pos-
session of an instrument that identifies her as the party to be
paid. The definition requires nothing more, so Z must be a
holder.
Before illustrating why Z is not a holder under Article 3,
despite what section 1-201(20) may suggest, it may be helpful
to examine prior law. Before Article 3 was revised in 1990, a
person possessing an instrument was a holder if the instrument
was drawn, issued, or indorsed to him, to his order, to bearer,
or in blank' Z appears to be a holder: she possesses a note
that has been indorsed to her. Under pre-revised Article 3,
however, indorsements had to be written by or on behalf of
holders.' Y indorsed the note, but Y was not a holder. Y pos-
sessed a note that X had issued to their father.' The father
never indorsed the note, so the note continued to identify him
as the party to be paid, even after Y obtained possession. Ab-
sent his father's indorsement, Y could not be a holder. And
since Y was not a holder, his wife could not be a holder as the
note was not "indorsed" to her.
42. See 1 U.L.A. § 1-201(20) at 24 (Supp. 1997) (defining "holder"); cf. NIL § 191
(defining "holer as "the payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of
it, or the bearer thereof').
43. See pre-revised § 3-202(2); see also Whaley, supra note 27, at 55-58 (noting
that examining the interplay between section 1-201(20) and pre-revised section 3-202
"leads to madness," but concluding that the latter section requires a legally effective
indorsement to be made "by one who technically qualifies" as a holder under the
former section); David Melinkoff, The Language of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77
YALE L.J. 185, 192-93 (1967). But see Robert F. T. Dugan, A New Approach to 'Hold-
er" Conundrums Under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code-A Reply to Pro-
fessor White, B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 1, 6-11 (1971) (suggesting that pre-revised
section 3-202(2) only requires the indorsement of a holder if the possessor is a hold-
er).
Note that the NIL contained no such clearly-expressed requirement in a single
provision, but courts frequently denied holder status to transferees of transferors who
were not holders. See, e.g., Berger v. Georgia Power Co., 49 S.E.2d 668 (Ga. App.
1948); Fidelity Natl Bank v. Vuci, 68 So.2d 781 (La. 1953); see also William E.
Britton, Transfers and Negotiations Under the Negotiable Instruments Law and Article
3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 32 TEL L. REV. 153, 160 (1953) ('The phrase 'by
or on behalf of the holder,' added by [pre-revised § 3-202(2) of the] Code, merely sets
forth expressly what is implied in Section 31 of the NIL.").
44. See pre-revised § 3-102(lXa) (defining "issue" as "the first delivery of an in-
strument to a holder or remitter").
45. See also 1 JAMES J. WHrE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCL
1998]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Reaching the same result under revised Article 3 is a bit
more challenging because the indorsement language was
dropped from section 1-201(20) in 1990 and replaced with lan-
guage requiring the possessor to be the "identified person" if
the instrument is not payable to bearer. The quoted term is not
defined,' but section 3-110, entitled "Identification of Person
to Whom Instrument is Payable," states that the intent of the
person signing as, or in the name or on behalf of, the issuer
determines to whom the instrument is initially payable."' This
provision is helpful in determining the proper payee, but it does
not expressly resolve issues concerning the identification of
subsequent parties. Arguably, one could apply the statute by
analogy and conclude that Y's intent controls because he law-
fully possesses the note, and Y's indorsement reveals an intent
to make the instrument payable to Z. Therefore, Z is the identi-
fied party and, accordingly, a holder. At the same time, howev-
er, one might plausibly contend the following: (i) the intent of
X, as maker, determines to whom the note is initially payable;
(ii) as manifested by the language used by X in drafting the
note, X intended the note to be payable to the order of X's
father; (iii) only X's father can honor X's intent; and (iv) until
X's father indorses the note, Y's intent (and the manifestation
of that intent through his indorsement) is irrelevant.
The indorsement provisions also do not conclusively resolve
the matter. Section 3-204 defines an "indorser" as "a person
who makes an indorsement," but the term is not defined in a
manner that requires the signature of a holder.49 Section 3-205
defines "special indorsement" as an indorsement by a holder
that makes an instrument payable to an identified person.'
Do these two provisions, taken together, mean that Z cannot be
CODE § 13-9, at 641 nn.6-7 and accompanying text (3d ed. 1988 [Practitioner's Edi-
tion]); White, supra note 12 at 1327.
46. This is true despite the fact that it appears in several provisions. See §§ 3-
103(aXll), 3-109(aX3), 3-109(b), 3-109(c), 3-110(cX2Xii), 3-201(b), and 3-205(a); cf. §§ 3-
404(b) and 3-405(a)(2) (referring to "person identified").
47. See § 3-110(a). If the issuer's signature is generated by automated means,
then the intent of the party that supplied the payee information to the machine con-
trols. See § 3-110(b).
48. § 3-204(b).
49. See § 3-204(a).
50. See § 3-205(a). Additionally, only a holder can make a blank indorsement. See
§ 3-205(b).
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a holder because only a special indorsement can make an in-
dorsee an identified person? Or can one resolve with certainty
only that Y's indorsement is not a special indorsement?51
Concluding that Z is a holder under revised Article 3 renders
a result contrary to that reached under pre-revised Article 3.52
Despite the 1990 revisions to section 1-201(20), the Official
Comments to section 1-201 do not reveal that any substantive
change was intended. Therefore, notwithstanding any contrary
inferences drawn from section 3-110 or the indorsement provi-
sions, Z probably is not a holder. In fact, if one looks behind
the statutes and examines the accompanying Official Com-
ments, the reader can convert that probability into certainty.
The Official Comments to section 3-201 state in relevant
part:
A person can become [a] holder of an instrument when the
instrument is issued to that person, or the status of holder
can arise as the result of an event that occurs after issu-
ance. "Negotiation7 is the term used in Article 3 to describe
this post-issuance event.'
This passage suggests that, in addition to satisfying the lan-
guage of section 1-201(20), a party does not become a holder
unless it obtains possession of the instrument by either "issu-
ance" or "negotiation." Several scholars have agreed with this
interpretation.
51. Because Y is not a holder, his indorsement is an anomalous indorsement. See
§ 3-205(d).
52. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text
53. § 3-201 cmt. 1. During my opening remarks, I stress to students the impor-
tance of reading the Official Comments that follow the assigned statutes. Regrettably,
more than a few students focus on "Comments" rather than "Official" and completely
ignore them-just like footnotes in cases.
54. See, e.g., 6A WHITAM D. HAWKLAND & LARY LAWRENCE, UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE SERIES [Rev] § 3-201:01, at 3 (1993) ("There are two ways of becoming a
holder. A person may become a holder by having the instrument issued to him in
bearer form or payable to his order. Or, he may become a holder through the
postissuance act of negotiation.") (footnotes omitted); STEVE L NICKLES, ET AL., MOD-
ERN COMM.RCIAL PAPER: THE NEW LAW OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (AND RELATED
COMMERCIAL PAPER) 157 (1994) ("A person becomes a holder either by issuance or
negotiation."). Professor Britton's treatise indicates the same requirement existed un-
der the NIL See WILLIAM E. BRrTroN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES
117 (2d ed. 1961) (l"he first holder of an instrument acquires title by issuance....
1998]
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Returning to the revised hypothetical, Z did not obtain pos-
session through "issuance," which is the first delivery of an
instrument by the maker or drawer for the purpose of giving
rights on the instrument to any person.' The instrument is a
note, so X is a maker rather than a drawer.' X first delivered
the note when he gave it to his father.57 At that moment, the
father became a holder because he satisfied the requirements of
section 1-201(20) (he possessed a note that identified him as
the party to be paid), and he obtained possession by issuance.
Issuance applies only to the first delivery of the instrument,"
so Z cannot take by issuance. Therefore, to be a holder, Z must
take the instrument by negotiation.
"Negotiation" is described as "a transfer of possession, wheth-
er voluntary or involuntary, of an instrument by a person other
than the issuer to a person who thereby becomes its holder.""9
That statement is not very helpful. X, the maker, is the issu-
er.' Y, a person other than the issuer, transferred possession
of the instrument to Z. As a result of this transfer, has Z be-
come a holder? Because she possesses an instrument that,
through Y's indorsement, identifies her as the party to be paid,
The second holder of a negotiable instrument and successive holders acquire title by
negotiation.").
55. See § 3-105(a).
56. See § 3-103(aX3), (5) (defining "drawer and "maker," respectively).
57. See § 1-201(14) (defining "delivery" as a "voluntary transfer of possession").
One of the more interesting cases in which ownership of a check turned on the pres-
ence or absence of "delivery" is Scherer v. Hyland, 380 A.2d 698 (N.J. 1977). Cather-
ine Wagner, the victim of an automobile accident, received a settlement check on the
morning of January 23, 1974. See id. at 699. Before committing suicide that after-
noon, she indorsed the check in blank and left it with two handwritten notes on the
kitchen table in the apartment that she shared with her long-time companion, Robert
Scherer. See id. In one of the notes she "bequeathed" to Scherer all of her posses-
sions, including the check. See id. at 699-700. Litigation ensued between the admin-
istrator of Wagner's estate and Scherer over the ownership of the check. As phrased
by the court,
[tihe primary issue here is whether Ms. Wagner's acts of endorsing the
settlement check, placing it on the kitchen table in the apartment she
shared with Scherer, next to a writing clearly evidencing her intent to
transfer the check to Scherer, and abandoning the apartment with a
clear expectation of imminent death constituted delivery sufficient to
sustain a gift causa mortis of the check.
Id. at 700. The court found a constructive delivery. See id. at 701-02.
58. See § 3-105(a).
59. § 3-201(a).
60. See § 3-105(c) ('Issuer' ... means a maker or drawer of an instrument.").
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she seems to be a holder under section 1-201(20). But Z, who
did not acquire possession by issuance, apparently must take
the note by negotiation to be a holder.6 Did Z take the note
by negotiation? It is difficult to tell under the foregoing quote,
which results in the following circular analysis: Z becomes a
holder by obtaining possession by negotiation; to obtain posses-
sion by negotiation, Z must become a holder.
Fortunately, Article 3 also states that an instrument payable
to an identified person is not negotiated unless it has been
indorsed by a holder. 2 When X issued the note, it was payable
to an identified person, his father. The father never indorsed
the note, so the note remained payable to an identified person
even after Y obtained possession. Therefore, the movement of
the note from Y to Z is a negotiation only if the note was in-
dorsed by a holder. Y, the only person to indorse the note, is
not a holder under section 1-201(20) because he possessed an
instrument that identified someone other than himself as the
party to be paid. Absent indorsement by a holder, Z did not
acquire possession by negotiation. And absent negotiation, Z is
not a holder, notwithstanding any contrary answer gleaned
from section 1-201(20) or any provision of Article 3.
"Holder" is one of the most important and frequently-used
terms in Article 3.' The hypothetical illustrates that the lan-
guage of section 1-201(20) could be improved by illuminating
the bridge that exists between possession, issuance, negotiation,
instruments payable to bearer, and instruments payable to an
identified person. The bridge would be more discernible if the
first sentence of section 1-201(20) were amended to read in its
entirety as follows:
"Holder," with respect to a negotiable instrument, means
the person who possesses, by issuance or negotiation, an
instrument payable to that person or payable to bearer.
61. See § 3-201 cmt. 1.
62. See § 3-201(b); cf. § 3-109 cmt 1 (An instrument that is payable to an iden-
tified person cannot be negotiated without the indorsement of the identified person.").
63. See supra notes 18-27 and accompanying text; White, supra note 12, at 1315
("Holder' is one of the most important terms of art used in Article Three of the
Code."); see also Lary Lawrence, Misconceptions About Article 3 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code: A Suggested Methodology and Proposed Revisions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 115,
126 (1983) ('The term 'holder' is one of the most important and basic terms in Arti-
cle 3.").
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III. MODIFYnG THE DESCRIPTION OF "NEGOTIATION"
The U.C.C. describes "negotiation" as follows:
(a) "Negotiation" means a transfer of possession, whether
voluntary or involuntary, of an instrument by a person
other than the issuer to a person who thereby becomes its
holder.
(b) Except for negotiation by a remitter, if an instrument
is payable to an identified person, negotiation requires
transfer of possession of the instrument and its indorsement
by the holder. If an instrument is payable to bearer, it may
be negotiated by transfer of possession alone."
Together, the two clauses indicate that a negotiation results
when three, and sometimes four, conditions are satisfied. First,
possession of the instrument must be transferred. Second, the
transferor cannot be the issuer. Third, the transferee must
become a holder as a result of the transfer. And fourth, if the
instrument is payable to an identified person, the transferor-
holder must indorse the instrument. The following hypothetical
suggests that the language in clause (a), which creates the
second requirement, may pose interpretive problems.
Patient has an upcoming dental appointment and knows the
amount of the bill. On the eve of the appointment, she signs
the check and completes all parts of it except the payee line,
which she leaves blank so the receptionist can complete it as
desired. She places the check in her purse, which is stolen just
before her appointment. Is Thief a holder?
Thief satisfies the definition of "holder" because he possesses
a check that is payable to bearer.' Thief also must acquire
64. § 3-201. Why are there two provisions? As one text explains,
Negotiation is both a noun and a verb, an end and the means for
accomplishing it. The purpose of 3-201(a) is only to label the process and
explain the result of negotiation, which is that the transferee becomes a
holder. The process itself-the conduct necessary for this result-is the
verb form of negotiation and is explained in 3-201(b).
NICKLES, supra note 54, at 158.
65. See § 1-201(20); see also § 3-109(aX2) (stating that an instrument is payable
to bearer if it "does not state a payee"); § 3-115 cmt. 2 ("Suppose Debtor pays Cred-
itor by giving Creditor a check on which the space for the name of the payee is left
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possession by issuance or negotiation to be a holder.' Issu-
ance, through its definitional reference to "delivery," requires
a voluntary transfer of possession." Thief stole the check,
which prevents delivery, so Thief did not obtain possession by
issuance. However, Thief did obtain possession by negotia-
tion-at least under clause (b) of section 3-201. At the time of
theft, the check was payable to bearer. Thus, negotiation exists
under the last sentence of clause (b) if there is a transfer of
possession. Clause (a) indicates that a transfer can be involun-
tary,69  so Thief's acquisition-albeit by improper
means--constitutes a transfer of possession.7" For negotiation
blank... The check is ... payable to bearer because it does not state a payee.");
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 30, § 17-3, at 154 ("On occasion, the drawer of a
check will intend to make the instrument payable to a particular person but will
neglect for some reason to insert that person's name in the blank space. Such an in-
strument is treated under sections 3-109 and 3-115(b) as payable to bearer . . . ).
A check signed by the drawer and complete but for the amount is not yet a
"negotiable instrument. See § 3-104(a) (requiring a "fixed amount of money"); § 3-115
cmt. 3 ("In some cases the incomplete instrument does not meet the requirements of
Section 3-104. An example is a check with the amount not filled in."). A drawer that
delivers such a check to another party may be accused of violating the "clearly stu-
pid" rule of jurisprudence.
66. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
67. § 3-105(a).
68. See § 1-201(14).
69. Two of the most important doctrines in Article 3 are the doctrine of negotia-
tion, codified at section 3-201, and the shelter doctrine, found at section 3-203. Both
use the term "transfer." Section 3-201 refers to a "transfer of possession," which can
be voluntary or involuntary. Section 3-203(b) refers to a "[tIransfer of an instrument"
which requires voluntary movement through the "delivery" reference in section 3-
203(a). As one text has observed, "It is very important to understand that 'transfer of
possession' for purposes of 3-201 is not the same as the transfer of an instrument
[when 'an instrument is transferred7 for purposes of 3-203." NICKLES, supra note 54,
at 159 (emphasis added). Confusion reigns supreme in the classroom when the over-
whelming number of students focus attention on "transfer" and not the prepositional
phrase that it precedes (and the accompanying relevance or irrelevance of voluntary
movement). This confusion could be greatly mitigated if section 3-201 used a term
other than "transfer" (eg., "change," as in "change in possession").
Perhaps I should be grateful for some confusion. If mere amateurs could navi-
gate safely the statutory waterways of the U.C.C. with confidence and comprehension,
then the Dean might force me to teach something else. I fear my options would in-
clude two classes that rm not qualified to teach- Civil Procedure (I still cannot deter-
mine whether Pennoyer or Neff was the accountant) and Property (my therapist trac-
es much of my angst to the incredibly low grade I received on my property exam, de-
spite the fact that I wrote a brilliant essay on restraint against alienation).
70. See Hall-Mark Elec. Corp. v. Sims (In re Lee), 179 B.R 149, 161 n.12 (B.AP.
9th Cir. 1995) ("Delivery is defined as a voluntary transfer of possession, whereas ne-
gotiation is the transfer of possession, whether voluntary or involuntary . .. ");
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of a check payable to bearer, clause (b) requires nothing more.
Therefore, Thief obtained the check by negotiation and is a
holder.7
That result has to be correct. Thief possesses a check payable
to bearer, so he should be a holder. To be a holder, however,
Thief must obtain possession by issuance or negotiation. The
involuntary movement precludes issuance, but not negotiation.
Thus, Thief must have obtained the check by negotiation. Oth-
erwise, we have a party that possesses an instrument payable
to bearer who is not a holder. That result is not possible, is it?
Application of clause (a) suggests that Thief may indeed be
such an unlucky fellow. Under clause (a), the transfer of posses-
CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, ET AL., PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND CREDIT INSTRUMENTS 63 (1996)
("Note, however, that a transfer' for purposes of the Code does not require a volition-
al transfer. See § 3-201(a). Thus, a finder of bearer paper may be a holder."); FRED
H. MILLER & ALvIN C. HARRELL, THE LAW OF MODERN PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND
NOTES S 3.02[2], at 3-16 n.61 (2d ed. 1992) ("Note the transfer can be involuntary;
thus a stolen bearer instrument is negotiated to a thief."); NICKLES, supra note 54, at
159 ("[Negotiation] includes an involuntary transfer and any other change of posses-
sion. Indeed, how possession is acquired is unimportant, both as to means and mo-
tive. It is a transfer of possession when a thief steals an instrument.").
71. As a holder, Thief is a person entitled to enforce the check. See § 3-301(i).
However, Patient may assert the defense of nonissuance. See § 3-105(b) ("An unissued
instrument ... is binding on the maker or drawer, but nonissuance is a defense."). If
the defense of nonissuance effectively prevents Thief from successfully enforcing the
check against Patient, why do we care if Thief is a holder?
The defense of nonissuance cannot be successfully asserted against a holder in
due course. See § 3-105 cmt. 2. Thief is not a holder in due course because he did
not give value for the instrument or acquire it in good faith. See § 3-302(aX2Xi)-(ii).
However, Thief can negotiate the check to a person who may qualify as a holder in
due course. See GILLETTE, supra note 70, at 72-73 ("[The thief of a bearer note] could
negotiate the note to a third party, and if that third party qualified as a holder in
due course, he or she could enforce it against the maker, notwithstanding
nonissuance."); RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, ET AL., PAYMENT SYSTEMS 107 (5th ed. 1993) ("If
a thief steals a bearer instrument, parties downstream will be holders and are likely
to be holders in due course."). To be a holder in due course, the transferee must be a
holder. See 3-302(a). To be a holder, Thief's transferee must obtain the check by ne-
gotiation. See § 3-201 cmt. 1 (indicating that a person becomes a holder by issuance
or negotiation). If the check remains payable to bearer, Thiefs transfer of possession
to the transferee is a negotiation under section 3-201 and the transferee will be a
holder (and perhaps a holder in due course). Thief's status as a holder is irrelevant.
Thief may nonetheless complete the check in a manner that makes it payable to an
identified person. For example, Thief could insert his name on the payee line. A
check that identifies Thief as the payee cannot be negotiated without the indorsement
of the holder. See § 3-201(b). In this instance, negotiation (and, accordingly, the
transferee's ability to qualify as a holder in due course) turns on Thief's status as a
holder.
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sion must be "by a person other than the issuer."72 This
phrase may have two meanings. First, it may mean that the
initiator of the transfer cannot be the issuer. If the phrase is
read in that manner, the concern is whether Thief is the issuer.
Second, it may mean that the party in possession immediately
prior to the transfer cannot be the issuer. Under that reading,
Patient's status is subject to scrutiny.
If the first interpretation is intended, then Thief becomes a
holder by negotiation because he is the initiator but not the
issuer. That translation renders the desired result; for that
reason alone, it may be preferred. Yet, the phrases "by a per-
son" and "to a person" suggest that the former (who cannot be
the issuer) refers to the person who had possession before the
transfer, and the latter (who must be a holder) refers to the
person who has possession after the transfer. That reading,
although plausible, produces an unacceptable result: Thief does
not become a holder by negotiation because Patient, the party
from whom Thief obtained the check, is the issuer. An addition-
al criticism of the second translation is that the phrases are "by
a person" and "to a person," not "from a person7 or "to another
person." 3 If the drafters intended the second translation, they
would have written the provision in a fashion that.better re-
vealed that intent;7' because they did not do so, the first inter-
pretation must be correct. Perhaps, but criticizing a proposed
translation simply because the provision is not written in the
best possible manner seems harsh.
If one comes to section 3-201 aware of what the law of nego-
tiable instruments is or should be, then knowing which of two
or more interpretations of a selected phrase to adopt becomes
an easy task. Nevertheless, for the occasional (or first-time)
visitor to Article 3, who reads its passages to discover what the
72. § 3-201(a).
73. One author has offered a hybrid of these phrases to describe a negotiation.
See LARY LAWRENCE, AN INTRODUCTION TO PAYMENT SYSTEMS 57 (1996) (-Negotiation'
is a transfer of possession . .. by a person other than the issuer (maker or drawer)
to another person who thereby becomes its holder.") (emphasis added) (footnote omit-
ted).
74. Montana's version of section 3-201(1) provides an example. See MONT. CODE
ANN. § 30-3-202(1) (1995) ("Negotiation' means a transfer of possession, whether vol-
untary or involuntary, of an instrument to a person who thereby becomes its holder
if possession is obtained from a person other than the issuer of the instrument.").
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law is, such a task can be quite challenging. For example, even
if clause (a) is read in a manner whereby negotiation hinges on
Patient's status as issuer, one might logically conclude that
negotiation has occurred. Thief did not take the check by issu-
ance,75 so common sense suggests that, absent issuance, Pa-
tient is not an issuer. If Patient is not an issuer, Thief obtained
the check by negotiation under clause (a), no matter how one
reads "by a person other than the issuer."
Occasionally, however, one must park common sense at the
portals of Article 3 before entering its statutory domain.7" This
is one of those occasions. Not surprisingly, "issuer" refers to the
maker or drawer of an instrument.77 The term, however, ap-
plies to both issued and unissued instruments.7" Because Pa-
tient is the drawer7" of an unissued instrument," she is the
issuer. Therefore, negotiation and, accordingly, Thief s status as
a holder, turn on knowing whether Patient or Thief is the sub-
ject of the phrase "by a person other than the issuer."
The desired result can be achieved if clause (b) alone is ap-
plied to the hypothetical. As clause (a) raises the interpretive
dilemma, perhaps it should be deleted in its entirety. However,
clause (a) expressly removes a roadblock to negotiation found
under pre-revised Article 3 and its predecessor, the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law ("NIL"). Under both of these stat-
utes, negotiation required "delivery" of the instrument."' Deliv-
ery would be absent under pre-revised Article 3 because the
transfer of possession between Patient and Thief was not volun-
tary.82 Delivery would be absent under the NIL because Pa-
75. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
76. Near the end of the semester, I usually conduct the following one-question
survey in my class: "What resource has helped you most in understanding the provi-
sions of Article 3?" "Common sense" usually finishes a distant fifth. More popular re-
sponses are (i) "the outline prepared by the student who received the highest grade
last semester," (ii) prayer, (iii) Dionne Warwick's psychic hotline, and (iv) "my good
friends Jack Daniels and Jim Beam."
77. See § 3-105(c).
78. See i&
79. See § 3-103(aX3) (defining "drawer" as "a person who signs or is identified in
a draft as a person ordering payment"); § 3-104(f) (indicating that a check, payable
on demand and drawn on a bank, is a "draf").
80. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
81. See pre-revised § 3-202(1); NIL § 30.
82. Pre-revised Article 3 incorporated the general definition of "delivery" from
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tient did not authorize the transfer of possession.' Now, how-
ever, lack of delivery no longer thwarts negotiation. Instead,
negotiation requires a "transfer of possession," which can be
voluntary or involuntary." This change is emphasized, and its
effect is illustrated, in the Official Comment to section 3-201.
In defining "negotiation" former Section 3-202(1) used the
word "transfer," an undefined term, and "delivery," defined
in Section 1-201(14) to mean voluntary change of posses-
sion. Instead, subsections (a) and (b) [of revised § 3-201]
use the term "transfer of possession and, subsection (a)
states that negotiation can occur by an involuntary transfer
of possession. For example, if an instrument is payable to
bearer and it is stolen by Thief or is found by Finder, Thief
or Finder becomes the holder of the instrument when pos-
session is obtained. In this case there is an involuntary
transfer of possession that results in negotiation to Thief or
Finder.8
The reference to voluntary or involuntary movement in clause
(a) is a statutory clarification worth saving in light of the dras-
tic departure from the delivery requirement in the NIL and
pre-revised Article 3.' This clarification could be easily sev-
Article 1. See § 3-102(4) and "Definitional Cross Reference7 following "Official Com-
ments to that section; see § 1-201(14) (defining "delivery" as a "voluntary transfer of
possession).
83. See NIL § 191 (defining "delivery" as a "transfer of possession, actual or con-
structive, from one person to another"); NIL § 16 ("As between immediate parties ...
the delivery, in order to be effectual, must be made either by or under the authority
of the party making, drawing, accepting, or indorsing, as the case may be . .. ."); see
also In re Andrews' Estate, 64 N.W.2d 261, 266 (Iowa 1954) ("What constitutes deliv-
ery of a promissory note by the maker is largely a matter of intention."); Bacal v.
National City Bank, 262 N.Y.S. 839 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1933) (holding that drawer who
mailed to his bank a check payable to cash never "delivered" the check to a thief
who pilfered the check from the mail); JAMES ht OGDEN, THE LAw oF NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS § 57, at 107 (5th ed. 1947) ("Delivery means transfer of possession with
intent to transfer title ..
84. § 3-201(a).
85. § 3-201 cat. 1. The hypothetical in the quoted passage does not conclusively
establish how the phrase "by a person other than the issuer" is to be interpreted
because the hypothetical does not reveal whether the issuer, initial payee, or subse-
quent party lost the instrument or had it stolen.
86. Although lack of delivery prevented negotiation under prior law, it did not
necessarily hinder scholars from persuasively arguing that in some instances a thief
who steals an instrument payable to bearer should be a holder. See, e.g., Dugan,
supra note 43, at 2-5; White, supra note 12, at 1316-26. With that in mind, replacing
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ered from clause (a) and preserved by adding a new sentence to
clause (b). In a similar manner, one could retain the require-
ment that the new party in possession must be a holder. This
cosmetic surgery excises from clause (a) all but the troublesome
phrase "by a person other than the issuer." Unless a sound
reason can be offered for its continued existence, the clause can
be deleted, taking with it the interpretive issues it raises.
By examining what might happen if the phrase were deleted,
one can arrive at a possible reason for its inclusion. Absent the
troublesome language, the consensual transfer of bearer paper
by the maker or drawer to the initial recipient is both an "is-
sue" under section 3-105(a) and a "negotiation" under section 3-
201(b). This awkward result exists because "issue" is defined as
"the first delivery of an instrument,""7 but that movement is
not excluded from the transfer of possession in the last sen-
tence of section 3-201(b).' The phrase "by a person other than
the issuer" may have been included in clause (a) for the pur-
pose of clarifying that a person can obtain possession by issu-
ance or negotiation, but not both, at least from the same move-
ment. Because "issuer," however, refers to makers and drawers
of issued and unissued instruments,89 the purpose is better
achieved (and the interpretive concerns disappear) if clause (a)
excludes any transfer that is an issuance under section 3-
105(a), rather than any transfer by (or from) an issuer under
section 3-105(c).
The foregoing concerns can be addressed-and the desired
result of making Thief a holder by negotiation can be
achieved-by redrafting clause (a) to read in its entirety as
follows.
"delivery" with "transfer of possession" may merely reflect a desire to resolve a statu-
tory dilemma, rather than an intent to change the law.
87. § 3-105(a).
88. The same awkward result, for the identical reason, existed under the NIL and
pre-revised Article 3. See NIL § 191 (limiting "issue" to the "first delivery"); NIL § 30
(stating that bearer paper is "negotiated by delivery" but not excluding the first de-
livery); pre-revised § 3-102(1)(a) (limiting "issue" to the "first delivery"); pre-revised §
3-202(1) (stating that bearer paper is "negotiated by delivery" but not excluding the
first delivery).
89. See § 3-105(c).
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"Negotiation" means a voluntary or involuntary transfer of
possession (excluding an issue) of an instrument to a person
who thereby becomes its holder.?
IV. CLARIFYING WHEN A PERSON CAN ENFORCE THE
UNDERLYING OBLIGATION AFTER TAKING AN INSTRUMENT
Playing the piano is one of my favorite pastimes." That
probably explains why so many of my classroom hypotheticals
involve that musical instrument." Consider the following sce-
nario, which is used to illustrate why limitations placed by
section 3-310 on remedies available to a person-who no longer
possesses an instrument because it has been lost, stolen, or de-
stroyed-should be revised.
Pianist agrees to buy a Steinway baby grand piano from
Dealer and delivers a check for the full purchase price to Deal-
er on Thursday. Dealer places the check (which is payable to
the order of Dealer), unindorsed, in its vault. Thief steals the
90. The commentary also should be revised in a manner that removes any sug-
gestion that negotiation must be a post-issuance event. See § 3-201 cmt. 1 ("A person
can become holder of an instrument when the instrument is issued to that person, or
the status of holder can arise as the result of an event that occurs after issuance.
'Negotiation' is the term used in Article 3 to describe this post-issuance event.") (em-
phasis added). In the overwhelming majority of cases, the instrument is negotiated
after it is issued. The Patient-Thief hypothetical, however, illustrates that an instru-
ment can be negotiated even though it has never been issued. Also, other provisions
of Article 3 state that a party can become a holder of an instrument not yet issued.
See § 3-104(aX1) (indicating that a negotiable instrument must be "payable to bearer
or to order at the time it is issued or first comes into possession of a holder"); § 3-
412 (stating that an issuer is obligated, in certain situations, to pay the instrument
"according to its terms at the time it was issued, or if not issued, at the time it first
came into possession of a holder"); § 3-414(b) (explaining that a drawer is obligated
to pay a dishonored and unaccepted draft "according to its terms at the time it was
issued or, if not issued, at the time if first came into possession of a holder"). By
stating that a person can be a holder of an unissued instrument, and because a per-
son must obtain possession by negotiation or issuance to be a holder, see supra notes
53-54, the provisions reveal that negotiation can occur before issuance.
91. And if I don't get tenure, it may be my only source of income (which could be
a problem unless I expand my repertoire beyond cartoon theme songs and selections
from THE BAPTW HYMNAL).
92. For example, I tell students in Secured Transactions to assume that a music
store retains a security interest in a piano sold on credit. I then ask them to classify
the piano in the buyer's hands. Most students correctly choose one of the three possi-
bly correct labels: inventory, equipment, or a consumer good. But at least one aspir-
ing comedian always suggests that the piano is an "instrument."
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check from the vault that evening. Dealer discovers the theft on
Friday. Dealer's efforts to contact Pianist are unsuccessful until
Wednesday. Pianist immediately contacts her bank and places a
"stop payment" order on the check. A bank officer calls Pianist
two hours later and explains that her "stop payment" order is
ineffective because the bank paid the check on Monday when it
was presented for payment." When Pianist relays this bad
news to Dealer, Dealer threatens to sue her if she fails to deliv-
er a replacement check immediately. Pianist is hesitant to do
that for at least two reasons. First, she does not have enough
funds in her checking account. Second, she is not too excited
about paying twice for one piano. 4 Does Article 3 permit Deal-
er to sue Pianist either on the stolen check or for failing to
honor her payment obligation?
Because the transaction involves an ordinary check, rather
than a certified check, cashier's check, or teller's check,
Pianist's underlying payment obligation is "suspended" when
she delivers the check to Dealer." As long as Pianist's pay-
93. See § 4-403 (indicating that a stop payment order must be "received at a time
and in a manner that affords the bank a reasonable opportunity to act on it before
any action by the bank with respect to the item described in Section 4-303"); § 4-
303(aX5) (stating that a reasonable period of time expires no later than "the close of
the next banking day after the banking day on which the bank received the check").
94. Even if it is a Steinway.
95. See § 3-310(b); see also Congress Indus. Inc. v. Federal Life Ins. Co. (Mutual),
560 P.2d 1268, 1270 (Ariz. App. 1977) ("[I]he law is clear that absent a specific
agreement to the contrary, issuance and acceptance of an ordinary check in and of
itself is only provisional satisfaction of a debt, and the obligation is not fully satisfied
until payment on the check is made."); National Bank of Commerce v. Chicago, B. &
N. R. Co., 46 N.W. 342, 344 (Minn. 1890) ("Where payment is made by check drawn
by a debtor on his banker, this is merely a mode of making a cash payment, and not
giving or accepting a security. Such payment is only conditional, or a means of ob-
taining the money."); pre-revised § 3-802 cmt. 3 ("It is commonly said that a check or
other negotiable instrument is 'conditional payment.' By this it is normally meant
that taking the instrument is a surrender of the right to sue on the obligation until
the instrument- is due, but if the instrument is not paid on due presentment the
right to sue on the obligation is 'revived.m); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CASES AND MATE-
RIALS ON NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 169 (4th ed. 1993) ("Under UCC 3-310(b), a check
is ordinarily taken as conditional rather than absolute payment, suspending the obli-
gation rather than discharging it."); ROBERT L. JORDAN & WILLIAM D. WARREN, COM-
MERCIAL LAW 918 (4th ed. 1997) ("In the hands of the payee the check represents a
right to receive money which is a property right of the payee. This property right is
provisionally substituted for the right of the payee to enforce the obligation for which
the check was received."); LAWRENCE, supra note 73, at 207 ("Unless the parties oth-
erwise agree, taking an ordinary instrument for an underlying obligation is treated as
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ment obligation remains suspended, Dealer cannot take any
action against her to enforce it.' Instead, Dealer's cause of
action against Pianist is limited to a lawsuit on the check. In
order to prevail, Dealer must prove that it is entitled to enforce
the check under section 3-301 and, absent possession, the terms
of the check. 7
The obligation remains suspended until the check is certified,
paid, or dishonored. 8 The check was never certified.' But
was it paid? One might argue that the bank paid the check
(which would discharge Pianist's payment obligation to the
extent of the check)"°m when it withdrew funds from Pianist's
account. On the other hand, a check is not "paid" unless the
bank made payment to a person entitled to enforce the
check.'' Because the check was payable to the order of Deal-
er, who had not yet indorsed the check prior to its theft, nei-
ther Thief nor any subsequent party could be a person entitled
to enforce the check."2 As Pianist's bank gave value to a per-
son not entitled to enforce the check,"se the check was not
only conditional payment of the obligation."); cf. § 2-511(3) ("Subject to the provisions
of this Act on the effect of an instrument on an obligation (Section 3-310), payment
by check is conditional and is defeated as between the parties by dishonor of the
check on due presentment.").
96. See HAWKLAND & LAWRENCE, supra note 54, [Rev] § 3-310:04, at 244.
97. See § 3-309(b); cf. pre-revised § 3-804 (requiring proof of ownership, facts
which prevent production of the instrument, and terms of the instrument).
98. See § 3-310(bXl).
99. The check was not certified because Pianises bank never agreed, in writing,
to pay the check at presentment. See § 3.409(a) (defining "acceptance"); § 3-409(d)
(defining "certified check").
100. See § 3-310(bXl).
101. See § 3-602(a).
102. Pianist's bank did not pay a holder (a person entitled to enforce under section
3-301(i)) because the absence of Dealer's indorsement prevented any subsequent party
from possessing an instrument properly identifying that party as the party to be
paid. See § 1-201(20). Nor did the bank pay a nonholder who enjoyed the rights of a
holder (a person entitled to enforce under section 3301(i)). The movement of the
check from Dealer to Thief was not voluntary, so Dealer's enforcement rights were
not transferred to Thief or any subsequent party. See § 3-203(a), (b); see also § 1-
201(14) (defining "delivery"). And finally, since the party who received payment is not
alleging that the check was lost, stolen, or misplaced, section 3-301(iii) is inapplicable.
See § 3-301(iii).
103. Because Pianist's bank paid someone other than a party entitled to enforce
the instrument, Dealer may have a conversion claim under section 3-420 against one
or more banks, including the depository bank and the payor bank. See § 3-420. Deal-
er may prefer to pursue its possible causes of action against Pianist, rather than one
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"paid."' Therefore, Pianist's underlying payment obligation
has not been discharged.
Absent certification or payment, the obligation remains sus-
pended" 5 unless the check was dishonored."c At first glance,
it does not appear that the bank dishonored the check. The
bank did not return the check to the party presenting it for
payment, nor did it give timely notice of dishonor to that par-
ty .' °7 This places Dealer in a quandary. Unless the check is
dishonored, Pianist's payment obligation remains suspended and
Dealer is left in the unenviable position of attempting to collect
on a check that has been stolen. Normally presentment is a
necessary predicate for dishonor.0 8 But how can Dealer pres-
ent a check that it does not hold? Fortunately for Dealer, two
statutes working together provide relief. First, Dealer may be
unable to make presentment with reasonable diligence, in
which case presentment is excused."° Second, when present-
ment is excused, dishonor occurs because the check has not
been paid."0 Once dishonor occurs, Pianist's payment obliga-
or more banks, especially if it enjoys a favorable relationship with a bank or a bank
is located in another jurisdiction. If, however, Thief stole several checks, then Dealer
may be inclined to bring a single lawsuit against one depositary bank rather than
multiple lawsuits against several drawers or numerous drawee banks. See JORDAN &
WARREN, supra note 95, at 918-19 ("Often a forged indorsement case involves thefts
of many checks from one payee by the same thief. Actions against the various draw-
ers of the stolen checks may not be feasible. An action against the person who took
the checks from the thief is usually a better remedy.").
104. See Arthur G. Murphey, Jr., Revised Article 3 and Amended Article 4 of the
Uniform Commercial Code: Comments on the Changes They Will Make, 46 ARK. L.
REV. 501, 589-90 (1993) ("To label the check as 'not paid' because it is not properly
paid is a change of terms from former Article 3 which used 'paid' to include improper
payment also.").
105. See § 3-310 cmt. 4 ("If the payor bank pays a person not entitled to enforce
the instrument .. .the suspension of the underlying obligation continues because the
check has not been paid."). See also Henry J. Bailey, New 1990 Uniform Commercial
Code: Article 3, Negotiable Instruments, and Article 4, Bank Deposits and Collections,
29 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 409, 472 (1993) ("If the payee's indorsement is forged, a
person taking from the forger is not entitled to enforce the instrument. If the payor
bank pays on the forged indorsement, the check has not been paid and the suspen-
sion of the underlying obligation continues.").
106. See § 3-310(b)(1).
107. See § 3-502(b)(1).
108. See § 3-502(bX2).
109. See § 3-504(a)(i).
110. See § 3-502(e); see also § 3-310 cmt. 4.
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tion is no longer suspended.' Instead, Dealer's right to sue
Pianist on her payment obligation is "revived."12
Once suspension of Pianist's payment obligation is lifted,
what remedies are available to Dealer? A lawsuit on the obliga-
tion? A lawsuit on the stolen check? Either? Both? Article 3
states that "if the check.., is dishonored and the obligee of
the obligation for which the instrument was taken is the person
entitled to enforce the instrument, the obligee may enforce
either the instrument or the obligation."" As the obligee,
Dealer appears to have a choice. Dealer can sue Pianist on ei-
ther her payment obligation or the check. However, the forego-
ing provision is expressly subject to section 3-310(b)(4),"4
which states in relevant part:
If the obligee is the person entitled to enforce the instru-
ment but no longer has possession of it because it was lost,
stolen, or destroyed, the obligation may not be enforced to
the extent of the amount payable on the instrument, and to
that extent the obligee's rights against the obligor are limit-
ed to enforcement of the instrment."
111. If Dealer is aware that the cancelled check has been returned to Pianist or is
in the custody of her bank or a collecting bank, then Dealer may attempt to repos-
sess the check voluntarily or through legal process. See LAWRENCE, supra note 73, at
220 ("When the person entitled to enforce the instrument knows who has possession
of the instrument, he must bring an action against that party to recover the instru-
ment.); DOUGLAs J. WHALEY, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PAYMENT Lw 189 (3d
ed. 1992) ("Since the check is still the property of the payee, he or she can replevy it
from its current possessor (probably the drawer, who will have it among his or her
cancelled checks) .. .."); Murphey, supra note 104, at 590 (suggesting that section 3-
309(aXiii) permits a payee to bring an action against a drawer for return of a can-
celled check). Dealer could then present the check for payment. Dealer's bank may
hesitate to attempt to collect a check that bears evidence of previous payment, so
Dealer may be forced to present the check, in person, to Pianists bank. Because the
check bears evidence of having been paid, Pianist's bank may refuse to pay the check
again. This refusal triggers dishonor, which lifts the suspension of Pianist's payment
obligation. Because Dealer can obtain the same result without going through this
exercise in futility, it may not attempt to repossess the check. The banks may force
Dealer to repossess the check, however, hoping that repossession discourages Dealer
from bringing a conversion action under section 3-420 against the banks. See § 3-420.
112. See MILLER & HARRELL, supra note 70, 1 7.01[c], at 7-4.
113. § 3-310(bX3).
114. See id. ("Except as provided in paragraph (4). ....
115. § 3-310(bX4).
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Under both quoted provisions, Dealer's rights are predicated
on its ability to prove that it is a person entitled to enforce the
check. Whether Dealer is such a person turns on knowing what
path the check traveled during the collection process. There are
at least four possibilities. First, the actual check was presented
to Pianist's bank and then returned to Pianist with her month-
ly bank statement. Second, the actual check was presented to,
and is being retained by, Pianist's bank.' Third, the actual
check was truncated. 7 but still exists. And fourth, the actual
check was truncated and then destroyed.
Absent possession, Dealer cannot be a holder."8 Unless the
check has been destroyed after truncation, Dealer may be able
to repossess the check from Pianist, her bank, or the truncating
party through voluntary surrender or legal process."9 Because
Dealer never indorsed the check, neither Thief nor any subse-
quent party could be a holder of the check, as no one would
116. Article 4 permits a bank to provide periodic statements and yet retain the
actual checks paid. The statement must provide information sufficient to allow the
customer to identify the checks paid. Minimum information includes the check num-
ber, amount, and payment date.See § 4-406(a).
117. A check is truncated when the physical transportation of the check is stopped
(or "truncated") in the check collection process. The actual check is either retained or
destroyed after material information on the check has been converted into electronic
data. See MILLER & HARRELL, supra note 70, $ 9.03[6], at 9-74. Most often a check is
truncated by the drawee bank, but an intermediary bank, the depositary bank, or
even the payee, may truncate the check. See BARKLEY CLARK: & BARBARA CLARK, THE
LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS, COLLECTIONS AND CREDIT CARDS T 16.02[I], at 16-3 to 16-4
(rev. ed. 1995). Truncation by a party other than the drawee bank is also known as
"electronic presentment" because information from the check, rather than the check
itself, is presented electronically to the drawee bank. See LAWRENCE, supra note 73,
at 350-51. Articles 3 and 4 anticipate check truncation. See §§ 3-501(b)(1) (authorizing
electronic presentment), 4-110 (describing an electronic presentment agreement), 4-209
(imposing a retention warranty), and 4-406(a), (b) (imposing disclosure and retention
duties on drawee banks).
A recent article estimates that 19% of all checks routed through the Federal
Reserve System (including approximately 450 million checks issued annually by the
United States Treasury) are truncated; however, fewer than 10% of all checks written
are truncated. See Patricia A. Murphy, Management Strategies: Paper Checks Persist
as Electronic Payments Gain, AM. BANKER, Jan. 6, 1997, at 12A. A recent study sug-
gests that the banking industry could save $850 million annually by instituting elec-
tronic check presentment and $600 million annually by truncating paper checks via
imaging and electronic check presentment exchanges. See Digital Checking Promises
Savings: Study Shows Banking Industry Could Save $2-3 Billion By Replacing Paper
Checks With Electronic Equivalents, BANK SYSTEMS TECH., May 1, 1997, at 16.
118. See § 1-201(20).
119. See supra note 111.
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take possession by negotiation.12° Since no party other than
Dealer can be a holder of a check made payable to the order of
Dealer, no indorsement by Thief or any other party is an effec-
tive blank or special indorsement." Therefore, the check re-
mains payable to the order of Dealer, and repossession will
make Dealer a holder.' As a holder, Dealer is a person enti-
fled to enforce the instrument.'s If the bank dishonors the
check after Dealer attempts to present it for payment, Dealer
has the option of suing Pianist on either the payment obligation
or the check.'
Perhaps Dealer should hope that the check, if truncated, has
been destroyed.' After the check is destroyed, the only way
Dealer can become a person entitled to enforce the check is to
invoke section 3-309.' That statute requires Dealer to jump
120. See § 3-201(b) (requiring, as a predicate to negotiation of an instrument pay-
able to an identified person, a holder's indorsement).
121. See § 3-205(a)-(b) (stating that special and blank indorsements must be writ-
ten by holders). An indorsement not made by a holder is an anomalous indorsement.
See § 3-205(d).
122. See § 1-201(20).
123. See § 3-301(i).
124. See § 3-310(bX3). Dealer prefers clause (3) over clause (4) because the former
provides Dealer with an option. Although the check was stolen, Dealer avoids clause
(4) if it regains possession. See § 3-310(bX4) ("If the obligee is the person entitled to
enforce the instrument but no longer has possession of it .. . .") (emphasis added).
125. If the check has been destroyed, Dealer retains its ability to sue one or more
banks for conversion under section 3-420. See § 3-420.
126. See § 3-301. Some courts have imposed a "clear and convincing evidence"
standard on parties attempting to enforce lost, stolen, or destroyed instruments. See,
e.g., Crawford v. 733 San Mateo Co., 854 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1988); Buster v. Gale,
866 P.2d 837 (Alaska 1994); Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. v. Dowling, 494 A.2d 1216
(Conn. App. 1985); Castellano v. Bitkower, 346 N.W.2d 249 (Neb. 1984); Lutz v.
Gatlin, 590 P.2d 359 (Wash. App. 1979). One court offered the following justification
for the heightened scrutiny-
We believe that the clear and convincing standard adopted by the
superior court is the appropriate standard of proof under [pre-revised § 3-
804], as it provides the heightened scrutiny that is necessary to ensure
that a party claiming to have lost physical control over an instrument
was in fact the rightful owner of the instrument. This heightened stan-
dard should reduce the instances where multiple parties come forward to
claim ownership of a missing note. While the statute envisions such a
problem and accordingly provides that a court may require the posting of
security to indemnify the defendant against future claimants, the
heightened burden of proof serves as an additional safeguard.
Buster, 866 P.2d at 844-45. Pre-revised section 3-804 has been replaced by section 3-
309. See § 3-309. Query whether a court will impose this higher standard of proof if
the instrument is a check, rather than a note, and no one disputes the whereabouts
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through four hoops. First, Dealer must have possessed the in-
strument at some time.' Dealer did possess the check from
the time Pianist delivered it until it was stolen. Second, Dealer
must have been entitled to enforce the check when the theft
occurred." Dealer acquired, by issuance,' possession of an
instrument that at the time of theft remained payable to the
order of Dealer. Therefore, Dealer was a holder under section 1-
201(20) at the time of theft and, accordingly, was a person
entitled to enforce the check under section 3-301(i). Third, Deal-
er must prove that its loss of possession did not result from a
transfer or lawful seizure."'s The check was stolen, so the loss
of possession did not result from a lawful seizure or a trans-
fer. 3' And fourth, Dealer must prove that it cannot repossess
the check because it has been destroyed, its location cannot be
determined, or it is wrongfully possessed by an unknown per-
son, a person that cannot be located, or a person that is not
amenable to service of process. Dealer cannot obtain posses-
sion if the check has been destroyed following truncation. Hav-
ing jumped through all of the hoops of section 3-309, Dealer
qualifies as a person entitled to enforce the check. However,
without possession of the actual check, Dealer's remedy is limit-
ed to suing Pianist on the check."
In summary, if Dealer can repossess the check, it enjoys the
right to sue Pianist on either the check or the underlying pay-
ment obligation if the bank dishonors the check following pre-
sentment. However, if Dealer cannot repossess the check be-
cause it has been destroyed following truncation, then Dealer's
only remedy is a lawsuit on the check. The question then be-
comes: Should destruction of a truncated check also destroy
Dealer's right to sue Pianist on the underlying obligation?tm
(or, alternatively, the destruction) of the actual check.
127. See § 3-309(aXi).
128. See id.
129. See § 3-105(a) (defining "issuance").
130. See § 3-309(a)(ii).
131. See id. (defining "delivery" as a voluntary movement); § 3-203(a) (indicating
that an instrument is transferred when it is "delivered").
132. See § 3-309(a)(iii).
133. See § 3-310(b)(4).
134. Pre-revised Article 3 did not limit the remedies available to a payee of a lost,
stolen, or destroyed instrument. See pre-revised § 3-802(l)(b) (" f the instrument is
dishonored action may be maintained on either the instrument or the obliga-
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The commentary explains why, under section 3-310, Dealer
cannot merely disregard the instrument no longer in its posses-
sion and elect to sue Pianist on the underlying contract. If
Dealer is not so constrained, then Pianist is exposed to the risk
that the check, when stolen, was payable to bearer." A check
payable to bearer could find its way into the hands of a holder
in due course, who might appear on Pianist's doorstep and
demand payment from her after Dealer had successfully sued
her on the underlying obligation."' That risk, however, is
nonexistent if the check has completed its journey through the
collection process before Dealer commences its lawsuit. If the
check has been destroyed; it is impossible for anyone to enforce
the check against Pianist after Dealer files its complaint.
A related concern is that Dealer may not be telling the truth.
Perhaps Dealer indorsed the check in blank before placing it in
the vault. If so, Thief was a holder of a check payable to bearer
and a person entitled to enforce the check."7 In that instance,
the check may have been "paid" under section 3-602(a), which
would discharge Pianist's payment obligation under section 3-
310(b)(1). Alternatively, maybe Thief was one of Dealer's em-
ployees. If so, an indorsement by that employee might be an
effective indorsement of Dealer.' If Dealer's indorsement was
effective, then payment probably was made to a person entitled
to enforce the check, the check would be "paid" under section 3-
602(a), and Pianist's payment obligation would be discharged
tion . . .. ".
135. See § 3-310 cmt. 4; see also § 3-309(b) ("The court may not enter judgment in
favor of the person seeking enforcement [of a lost, destroyed, or stolen instrument]
unless it finds that the person required to pay the instrument is adequately protected
against loss that might occur by reason of a claim by another person to enforce the
instrument.").
136. See § 3-309 cmt. ("F[T]here is substantial risk that a holder in due course may
make a demand for payment if the instrument was payable to bearer when it was
lost or stolen."). Pianist's defense of previous payment cannot be successfully asserted
against a holder in due course. See § 3-305(b) (indicating that a holder in due course
is subject only to the so-called "real defenses" codified in section 3-305(aX1)).
137. See §§ 1-201(20), 3-301(i).
138. See § 3-405(b) ("[f an employer entrusted an employee with responsibility
with respect to the instrument and the employee... makes a fraudulent indorse-
ment of the instrument, the indorsement is effective as the indorsement of the person
to whom the instrument is payable if it is made in the name of that person").
Subsection (a) defines "employee," "fraudulent indorsement," and "responsibility." § 3-
405(a).
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under section 3-310(b)(1). Prudence (and lack of funds) should
prompt Pianist to question Dealer's story, so she shares these
concerns. But these concerns exist whether Dealer sues her on
the check or on the underlying obligation and can be raised and
addressed in either lawsuit because the physical check, or a
two-sided legible copy' produced digitally, from microfiche, or
otherwise, can be introduced at trial. Handwriting experts can
testify whether Dealer's indorsement is a genuine or forged
indorsement or the indorsement of a disgruntled employee. If
evidence indicates that the bank paid a person entitled to en-
force the check, then the court can enter judgment in favor of
Pianist. And if the bank acted improperly, the court can order
Pianist to issue a replacement check to Dealer but protect her
against double liability by ordering the bank to recredit her
account for the amount of the stolen check."
Dealer may prefer bringing an action on the instrument,
rather than for breach of contract, for procedural reasons. In a
contract action, Dealer's complaint must allege (i) the existence
of a contract, (ii) the terms of that contract, (iii) the consider-
ation given by Dealer, (iv) satisfaction by Dealer of all condi-
tions precedent, (v) Pianist's breach, and (vi) damages. 4' If
Pianist places any alleged facts in issue, then Dealer bears the
burden of proof and persuasion on those facts. If, however,
Dealer brings a lawsuit on a check that has been destroyed by
139. A party that destroys a check following truncation must maintain the capacity
to furnish a legible copy of the check for seven years from the date of receipt. See §
4-406(b). A customer has the right to request a legible copy from its bank. See id. If
the drawee bank did not truncate the check, then the drawee bank can obtain a
legible copy from the truncating party in accordance with the truncation agreement
between themselves.
140. See § 4-401(a) ("A bank may charge against the account of a customer an
item that is properly payable from the account .... ."); § 4-401 cmt. 1 ("An item con-
taining a... forged indorsement is not properly payable."). If Pianist's bank is
forced to recredit her account, the bank may attempt to recover its loss by suing
other parties in the collection process for breaching the presentment warranty of
enforcement. See §§ 3-417(aXl), 4-208(aX1). The defendant in that lawsuit may at-
tempt to recover its loss by initiating a lawsuit against other parties in the collection
process, including Thief, for breaching the transfer warranties concerning enforcement
and signatures. See §§ 3-416(aXl), (2); §§ 4-207(aXl), (2). In a perfect world, Thief
will bear the loss. If Thief cannot be located, the loss will fall on the party who took
the check from Thief. This seems only fair, as that person was in the best position to
detect the theft by demanding identification.
141. See Stanley V. Kinyon, Actions on Commercial Paper: Holder's Procedural Ad-
vantages Under Article Three, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1441, 1459 (1967).
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the truncating party, Dealer need only prove the terms of the
check, Dealer's right to enforce the check, and the validity of
Pianist's signature as drawer of the check.' Dealer can prove
the terms of the check by introducing a legible photocopy of the
truncated check.143 As already illustrated,' 44  Dealer can
prove enforcement through sections 3-301(iii) and 3-309.
Pianist's signature is presumed genuine unless she specifically
denies its authenticitY.45 In an action on the check, Dealer
need not allege or prove the existence or terms of any underly-
ing contract, the nature (or adequacy) of any consideration
given, Dealer's satisfaction of any conditions precedent, or any
breach and resulting damages.' Instead, those matters be-
come issues Pianist must raise as affirmative defenses.'
In many lawsuits on lost, stolen, or destroyed instruments, a
court will order the payee to provide "adequate protection"
under section 3-309(b).' For that reason, Dealer may prefer
bringing an action on the underlying obligation rather than the
check. In this situation, Dealer's worry is misplaced. A court
will order adequate protection only if it is necessary to protect
Pianist against any loss that might occur on a claim made by
another person entitled to enforce the check.14 That loss,
however, is nonexistent because no other person can come for-
ward with a valid enforcement claim if Dealer proves that the
142. See §§ 3-308(a), 3-309(b).
143. See Crawford v. 733 San Mateo Co., 854 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1988);
HAWKLAND & LAWRENCE, supra note 54, [Rev] § 3-309:06, at 231-32.
144. See supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text.
145. See § 3-308(a); see also § 1-201(31) (defining "presumption" and "presumed").
The official comment to section 3-308 provides:
The presumption rests upon the fact that in ordinary experience forged
or unauthorized signatures are very uncommon, and normally any evi-
dence is within the control of, or more accessible to, the defendant. The
defendant is therefore required to make some sufficient showing of the
grounds for the denial before the plaintiff is required to introduce evi-
dence.
§ 3-308 cmt. 1.
146. See Kinyon, supra note 141, at 1460-61.
147. See id.; see also § 3-303(b) (The drawer or maker of an instrument has a
defense if the instrument is issued without consideration.") (emphasis added).
148. Courts have discretion in fashioning the type and amount of adequate protec-
tion. See § 3-309 cmt The protection can take many forms, including a surety bond,
a standby letter of credit, or an indemnification agreement. See CLARK & CLARK,
supra note 117, 2.05, at 2-46.
149. See § 3-309(b).
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check has been destroyed and introduces into evidence a legible
two-sided copy of the instrument that reveals all indorsements.
In short, absent unusual circumstances," Dealer will prefer
bringing an action on the check rather than the underlying
obligation. But just because a lawsuit on the check may be
Dealer's first choice does not justify a provision that makes it
Dealer's only choice. And the concerns that warrant an exclu-
sive remedy are not present when the truncated check has been
destroyed. Therefore, the second sentence of section 3-310(bX4)
should be amended to read in its entirety as follows:
I
If (i) the obligee is the person entitled to enforce the instru-
ment but no longer has possession of it and (ii) the instru-
ment has not been destroyed by the person making elec-
tronic presentment, then the obligation may not be enforced
to the extent of the amount payable on the instrument, and
to that extent the obligee's rights against the obligor are
limited to enforcement of the instrument.
V. REVISiNG THE TRANSFER WARRANTY OF ENFORCEMENT
In September 1994, I achieved the life-long dream of many
Americans: I appeared on "The Oprah Winfrey Show." Just
kidding. 5' Actually, I bought my first house.'52 As part of
150. Dealer might be motivated to bring a cause of action on the underlying obli-
gation if (i) a legible copy of the destroyed check cannot be obtained, (ii) the contract
permits Dealer to recover attorney fees and other litigation costs, or (iii) the statute
of limitations on the instrument claim has expired but continues to run on the con-
tract claim. The third situation may be the most likely. Dealer must commence its
action to enforce the check within three years of dishonor. See § 3-118(c). In many
jurisdictions, the statute of limitations on a contract claim involving the sale of goods
is longer than three years. See, e.g., § 2-725(1) ("An action for breach of any contract
for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has ac-
crued.); 3 WLLjAM D. HAWELAND, UNIFORm CoMERCAL CODE SEMES § 2-725, at
716-18 (1994) (indicating that (i) most states have adopted the 4-year period, (ii)
Oklahoma has adopted a 5-year period, and (iii) Mississippi, South Carolina, and
Wisconsin have adopted a 6-year period).
151. In fact, I am sufficiently dysfunctional to be a part of the lurid talk show
world. Just last month, I declined Jerry Springer's invitation to be part of his show
devoted to "Law Professors Who Teach Uniform Commercial Code Courses (And The
Women Who Love Them)." Honest.
152. And just before the closing, I made the mistake of watching THE MONEY PIT
(Universal Pictures 1986). I had nightmares for weeks.
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the process, the title company requested that I bring a cashier's
check, made payable to its order, to the closing. My bank was
happy to issue the requested check to me,"5 and I delivered it
to the title company at the appropriate time. Presumably, my
bank paid the cashier's check when either the title company or
its bank presented the check for payment.
This transaction occurs many times almost every day. First
Bank issues a cashier's check payable to the order of Title
Company and delivers the check to its customer, Home Buyer.
Home Buyer, known as a "remitter" under Article 3,1' deliv-
ers the check to Title Company. Title Company deposits the
check into its account at Second Bank. Second Bank presents
the check to First Bank for payment, and First Bank then pays
the check. Assume, however, that First Bank becomes insolvent
between issuance and presentment and, as a result, the check
is dishonored. Meanwhile, Second Bank has extended provision-
al credit to Title Company for the amount of the check, and
Title Company has drawn on some of that credit. What rights
and remedies are available to Second Bank? Furthermore, if
Second Bank can deflect any loss to Title Company, what rights
and remedies are available to Title Company? The following
analysis reveals that Title Company may have a statutory rem-
edy under section 3-416 that should not exist.
Second Bank may debit Title Company's account for the
amount of the check under Article 4, which states:
If a collecting bank ' has made provisional settlement
with its customer for an item and fails by reason of dis-
honor, suspension of payments by a bank, or otherwise to
153. For a fee, of course. I would be happy, too, if I could charge a fee for every-
thing I do.
154. See § 3-103(aX11) (defining "remitter" as "a person who purchases an instru-
ment from its issuer if the instrument is payable to an identified person other than
the purchaser"). The term was selected "apparently because [the purchaser] typically
remits the instrument in payment of an obligation... ." Alvin C. Harrell & Fred H.
Miller, The New UCC Articles 3 and 4: Impact on Banking Operations, 47 CONSUMER
FIN. L.Q. REP. 283, 286 (1993).
155. Second Bank falls within the definition of "collecting bank." See § 4-105(5)
(defining "collecting bank" as "a bank handling an item for collection except the payor
bank"). First Bank is the "payor bank." See §§ 4-105(3) (defining "payor bank" as "a
bank that is the drawee of a draft"), 4-104(aX7), (8) (defining "draf and "drawee,"
respectively).
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receive settlement for the item which is or becomes final,
the bank may revoke the settlement given by it, charge
back the amount of any credit given for the item to its
customer's account, or obtain refund from its custom-
er ....
Assuming that Second Bank gave provisional, rather than final,
credit to Title Company at the time of deposit,5 " Second Bank
may take the action stated because it has failed to receive final
payment of the cashier's check for one of the three stated rea-
sons: the check has been dishonored.1"8 The statute requires
Second Bank to either return the cashier's check to Title Com-
pany or, after Second Bank learns of the dishonor, notify Title
Company of the problem.'59 If Second Bank fails to take the
required action "by its midnight deadline or within a longer
reasonable time after it learns the facts," it will be liable for
any damages caused by the delay." ° Nevertheless, a delay
does not prevent Second Bank from revoking the settlement,
156. § 4-214(a).
157. The statutory presumption is that a collecting bank gives provisional settle-
ment for a check deposited by its customer. See § 4-201(a). The contract between a
bank and its customer may dictate that settlement for some or all checks (e.g.,
cashier's checks or checks drawn on the Treasury of the United States) is final at the
time of deposit.
158. Second Bank also may argue that First Bank has "suspended payments," es-
pecially if the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation has been appointed as receiver.
See § 4-104(aX12) ('Suspends payments' with respect to a bank means that it has
been closed by order of the supervisory authorities, that a public officer has been
appointed to take it over, or that it ceases or refuses to make payments in the or-
dinary course of business."). The statutory phrasing in section 4-214(a) is disjunctive,
so Second Bank need only prove one of the three events that permit it to exercise
the remedies afforded by the statute.
159. See § 4-214(a).
160. Id. Second Bank's "midnight deadline" is "midnight on its next banking day
following the banking day on which it receives the relevant item or notice or from
which the time for taking action commences to run, whichever is later." § 4-
104(aX10); see also § 4-104(aX3) (defining "banking day" as "the part of a day on
which a bank is open to the public for carrying on substantially all of its banking
functions"); United Bank of Crete-Steger v. Gainer Bank, NA, 874 F.2d 475 (7th Cir.
1989) (interpreting "banking day"). For example, if Second Bank receives the dishon-
ored check from First Bank on Tuesday morning, then its "midnight deadline" is
Wednesday at midnight if both Tuesday and Wednesday are banking days. If Second
Bank receives the check on Friday morning, then its "midnight deadline" is Monday
at midnight if Friday and Monday are banking days, but Saturday and Sunday are
not.
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reversing the credit to Title Company's account, or otherwise
obtaining a refund from Title Company.''
This remedy may be the most attractive to Second Bank. The
bank can act unilaterally and is usually made whole. However,
the bank may be forced to consider other alternatives for at
least three reasons. First, Title Company may have closed the
account before Second Bank could debit the account. Second, a
debit may result in an overdraft, leaving Second Bank (at least
temporarily) with a partial loss. And third, Second Bank may
hesitate to pursue any remedy against Title Company if Title
Company is one of Second Bank's most valued customers.
Another statutory theory of recovery from Title Company may
be available to Second Bank. If Title Company indorsed the
check, it must pay the amount due on the check according to
the terms of the check at the time of indorsement." That ob-
ligation arises once the check is dishonored 1" and is owed to
Second Bank if Second Bank is entitled to enforce the
check.'" Title Company deposited the check into its account,
so most likely any indorsement it placed on the check was
blank, rather than special.' Therefore, Second Bank became
a holder: a party who, by negotiation,"6 obtained possession of
an instrument payable to bearer.67 Although Second Bank
lost that status when it routed the check to First Bank for
payment, Second Bank regained that status when First Bank
returned the dishonored check to it."6 As a holder, Second
161. See § 4-214(a).
162. See § 3-415(a).
163. See Ud (" [f an instrument is dishonored, an indorser is obliged to pay the
amount due . . . .).
164. See id- ("The obligation of the indorser is owedito a person entitled to enforce
the instrument .. . ).
165. Title Company's indorsement, consisting of its name, may have been accompa-
nied by "for deposit only" or some variation of that phrase. Contrary to popular be-
lief, the addition of that phrase does not convert an otherwise blank indorsement into
a special indorsement. The indorsement remains blank, but it also becomes re-
strictive. See § 3-205 cmt. 2 ("'For deposit only' followed by the signature of the pay-
ee of a check is a restrictive indorsement. It is also a blank indorsement because -it
does not identify the person to whom the instrument is payable.").
166. See § 3-201(b) ("If an instrument is payable to bearer, it may be negotiated
by transfer of possession alone.").
167. See § 1-201(20).
168. The special indorsement of Second Bank, or any other bank in the collection
chain, would not preclude holder status. Once First Bank returns the check to Second
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Bank is entitled to enforce the instrument169 and, accordingly,
can attempt to recover the amount of the dishonored cashier's
check from Title Company on a theory of indorser liability.Y°
Again, however, Second Bank may hesitate before it initiates
litigation against Title Company, especially if Title Company is
one of its most important customers. Furthermore, the cause of
action only exists if Title Company indorsed the check. It is
probable that Title Company indorsed the check, but banks
have been known to accept unindorsed checks for deposit."'
Therefore, recovery against Title Company on a theory of in-
dorser liability may not be an attractive option.
Unfortunately (for Second Bank), Article 3 offers no other
possible cause of action. Second Bank cannot sue Title Compa-
ny for breach of presentment warranty under section 3-417.
Clause (a) offers no relief because it applies only to unaccepted
drafts,7 2 and a cashier's check is accepted at issuance.17
Furthermore, the warrantor makes the stated warranties to the
Bank, Second Bank may cancel its own indorsement and all subsequent indorsements,
effectively leaving Title Company's blank indorsement as the last operative indorse-
ment. See § 3-207.
169. See § 3-301(i).
170. See § 3-415(a).
171. Article 4 recognizes this practice. See § 4-205(l), cmt.
172. See § 3-417(a). The same limitation prevents Second Bank from invoking the
presentment warranties codified at section 4-208(a). See id. § 4-208(a).
173. See Hall-Mark Elec. Corp. v. Sims (In re Lee), 108 F.3d 239, 241 n.2 (9th Cir.
1997) ("As the [Bankruptcy Appellate Panel] pointed out, a cashier's check is accepted
upon issuance."); Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A, 370 F. Supp. 276, 278
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (noting that "the issuance of the cashier's check constitutes an accep-
tance by the issuing bank"); Godat v. Mercantile Bank, 884 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Mo. CL App.
1994) (en banc) ("A cashier's check is accepted by the issuing bank by the mere act
of its issuance."); Jane E. Tobin, The Rights of a Remitter of a Negotiable Instrument,
8 B.C. INDuS. & COM. L. REV. 260, 261 (1967) ("Technically, [a cashier's check] is a
bill of exchange which is accepted at the moment of its issuance .... ").
The statutory analysis that renders the "acceptance at issuance" conclusion is
as follows. The drawer is the party that signs the cashier's check. See § 3-103(aX3).
The drawer and drawee of a cashier's check are the same party. See § 3-104(g) (de-
fining 'cashier's check"). Therefore, the drawer's signature is also the drawee's signa-
ture. And the drawee's signature triggers acceptance. See § 3-409(a) (indicating that
acceptance "may consist of the drawee's signature alone"). What seems to be irrele-
vant, at least to those disciples of the foregoing analysis, is that the drawer executes
the cashier's check in its capacity as drawer, not drawee. Simply because the drawer
and the drawee are the same entity does not necessarily mean that any signature
made in one capacity should automatically be construed as a signature made in the
other capacity.
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drawee;'74 First Bank is the drawee, so Second Bank has no
standing to invoke clause (a). Nor can Second Bank invoke
clause (d). Clause (d) applies to dishonored drafts,175 such as
the cashier's check, but the warranty is made only when the
dishonored check has been presented to the drawer or an in-
dorser and payment is received. 78 This check was dishonored,
but payment has not yet been made by any party.
Does section 3-416, the transfer warranty section, offer any
hope? Probably not. Second Bank can jump over the two proce-
dural hurdles of the section: the movement of the check from
Title Company to Second Bank was a "transfer" for which Sec-
ond Bank received consideration.' Therefore, Title Company
made the five stated warranties to Second Bank.' However,
unless Title Company had knowledge, at the time of deposit,
that an insolvency proceeding had commenced against First
Bank,7 ' Title Company did not breach any of the
warranties."s
174. See § 3-417(a) (stating that the warranties are made "to the drawee making
payment or accepting the draft in good faith"). See also § 4-208(a) (similar limitation).
175. See § 3-417(d); see also § 4-208(dXi).
176. See § 3-417(d); see also § 4-208(d) (similar requirement).
177. See § 3-416(a) ("A person who transfers an instrument for consideration war-
rants to the transferee . . . "); see also § 4-207(a) (similar language). The movement
of the check from Title Company to Second Bank was a "transfer" as defined at sec-
tion 3-203(a) for three reasons: (1) the movement was voluntary (and thus a 'deliv-
ery" under section 1-201(14)); (2) Title Company was not the issuer (a label ascribed
by section 3-105(c) to First Bank as the drawer of the check); and (3) Title Company
tendered the check to Second Bank so Second Bank could enforce the check against
First Bank. Title Company received "consideration7 (defined at section 3-303(b) as
"any consideration sufficient to support a simple contrac") in the form of provisional
credit, and Second Bank's agreement to obtain payment of checks deposited by its
customers.
178. See § 3-416(a) ("A person who transfers . ., warrants to the transfer-
ee . .. '); see also § 4-207(a) (similar language).
179. See § 3-416(aX5); see also § 1-201(25) (defining "knowledge7 as actual, rather
than constructive, knowledge); § 1-201(22) (defining "insolvency proceedingsr as "any
assignment for the benefit of creditors or other proceedings intended to liquidate or
rehabilitate the estate of the person involved"); § 4-207(aX5) (similar warranty as
section 3-416(aX5)).
180. Title Company possessed a check payable to its order which it had obtained
by negotiation, so Title Company was a holder and a person entitled to enforce the
check under section 3-301(i). Therefore, Title Company did not breach the first trans-
fer warranty. See §§ 3-416(aXl), 4-207(aXl). Also, all signatures were authentic and
authorized, rather than forged, and the instrument was not altered in any manner.
See §§ 3-416(aX2), (3); §§ 4-207(aX2), (3). Nor do the facts suggest that any party had
a defense or recoupment claim against Title Company. See §§ 3-416(aX4), 4-207(aX4).
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Perhaps Second Bank should consider possible causes of ac-
tion under Article 3 against Home Buyer, especially if Title
Company is a valued customer of the bank and Home Buyer is
not. Unfortunately, Article 3 provides no such action. First
Bank made the cashier's check payable to the order of Title
Company at issuance, so Home Buyer need not, and most likely
did not, indorse the check before delivering it to Title Compa-
ny.' The absence of Home Buyer's indorsement prevents Sec-
ond Bank from suing Home Buyer for indorser liability under
section 3-415. For the same reason, Second Bank cannot argue
that Home Buyer breached any transfer warranty. Home Buyer
only makes transfer warranties to subsequent transferees, such
as Second Bank, if Home Buyer indorsed the instrument."s
No other theories of recovery against Home Buyer are available
to Second Bank under Article 3. Therefore, Second Bank proba-
bly will attempt to recoup any loss from its customer, Title
Company.
Title Company may recover its loss from the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation by treating the dishonored cashier's
check as an 'insured deposit.""8 The check, however, may not
be fully insured if its amount exceeds $100,000.' Further-
181. Any indorsement by Home Buyer would be an anomalous indorsement under
section 3-205(d). See § 3-205(d).
182. See § 3-416(a); see also LAWRENCE, supra note 73, at 171 ("Thus, when the
transferor does not indorse the instrument, he makes the warranty only to his imme-
diate transferee. If he indorses the instrument, he makes the warranty to all sub-
sequent transferees."); NICKLES, supra note 54, at 211 ("A transferor without indorse-
ment warrants only to her immediate transferee. An indorser warrants to her imme-
diate transferee and every subsequent transferee.").
Section 4-207(a) does not have a similar limitation. That section imposes trans-
fer warranties only on collecting banks and customers of those collecting banks. See §
4-207(a). Title Company, rather than Home Buyer, is the "customer, in the hypotheti-
cal. Therefore, Home Buyer did not make the transfer warranties in section 4-207.
183. See 12 U.S.C. § 1813(IX4) (Supp. 1997) (including cashier's checks within the
definition of "deposit"); id. § 1813(m) (Supp. 1997) (defining "insured deposit" as "the
net amount due to any depositor for deposits in an insured depository institution" as
determined under applicable statutes); see also Metro County Title, Inc. v. FDIC, 13
F.3d 883, 886 n.8 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1813(1) as authority for conclud-
ing that "unpaid cashier's checks are considered deposits for purposes of FDIC deposit
insurance coverage"); FDIC v. McKnight, 769 F.2d 658, 662 (10th Cir. 1985) ('There-
fore, in its capacity as insurer, FDIC was required to pay each of the debts repre-
sented by the cashier's checks as insured deposits in accordance with § 1813(X4) and
12 C.F.R. § 330.11."), cert. denied sub nom., All Souls Episcopal Church v. FDIC, 475
U.S. 1010 (1986).
184. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(1)(B) (Supp. 1997) (generally limiting a depositor's cover-
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more, Title Company's right to any proceeds is subordinate to
any remaining claim of Second Bank."s Therefore, Title Com-
pany may find this remedy inadequate and turn to the U.C.C.
for solace.
Two theories of recovery from Home Buyer come to mind
immediately: indorser liability and liability for breaching a
transfer warranty. However, Home Buyer probably never in-
dorsed the check because it was payable to the order of Title
Company. Therefore, indorser liability under section 3-415 is
not a viable theory.1" And if Second Bank could not bring a
cause of action against Home Buyer for breach of transfer war-
ranty,,8 then it seems doubtful that Title Company should be
able to do so. Perhaps. But it can be done.
For section 3-416 to apply, Title Company must prove that
the movement of the check from Home Buyer to Title Company
was a "transfer" for "consideration."" The movement was a
"transfer" as defined in section 3-203(a). Home Buyer, a party
other than the issuer," voluntarily tendered the check to Ti-
age to $100,000); see also Metro County Title, 13 F.3d at 883 (upholding FDIC's pay-
ment of $100,000 to holder of three cashier's checks totaling $1,440,000); McKnight,
769 F.2d at 661 (concluding that holders of cashier's checks were insured up to
$100,000; FDIC's erroneous payments in excess of $100,000 constituted unjust enrich-
ment).
185. See § 4-201(a) (indicating that while Title Company may remain the owner of
the check, its rights to the proceeds of the check "are subject to rights of a collecting
bank, such as those resulting from outstanding advances on the item and rights of
recoupment or setoff').
186. See § 3-415; see also § 3-401(a) (stating that a person is not liable on an
instrument unless that person or his authorized agent signs the instrument).
187. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
188. See § 3416(a).
189. One might argue that Home Buyer-as a mere courier or middleman, or per-
haps as an agent of First Bank-should be treated as the issuer, which would pre-
clude a "transfer." This argument is without merit for at least three reasons. First,
the only "issuer" of a check is the "drawer." See § 3-105(c). A "drawer" is "a person
who signs or is identified in a draft as a person ordering payment § 3-103(aX3).
Home Buyer cannot fall within that definition because he neither signed the check
nor was identified in the check as a person ordering payment. The check identifies
only one person ordering payment: First Bank. Second, the commentary expressly
states that the transfer of the check by Home Buyer to Title Company is a negotia-
tion. See § 3-201 cmt. 2; see also Bailey, supra note 105, at 449 ("The bank's delivery
to the buyer as remitter is issuance of the check, not negotiation. But delivery by the
buyer to the seller-payee is negotiation."). The transferor in a negotiation cannot be
an issuer. See § 3-201(a). Third, Home Buyer is a remitter, a party that "purchases
an instrument from its issuer." § 3-103(aXll) (emphasis added). The italicized lan-
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tie Company for the purpose of giving Title Company the right
to enforce the check against First Bank. Additionally, Title
Company's agreement to provide title insurance to Home Buyer,
filing of the appropriate documents in the real property records,
and performance of other services constituted "consider-
ation.""9 Therefore, Home Buyer made the five transfer war-
ranties to Title Company. 9'
If Title Company can prove that First Bank was involved in
an insolvency proceeding at the time of deposit and Home Buy-
er had knowledge of the proceeding, then Title Company can
establish that Home Buyer breached a transfer warranty."
Title Company can rely on objective evidence to establish the
commencement date of any insolvency proceeding, but proving
that Home Buyer had actual knowledge of that event at the
time of deposit may be sufficiently difficult to prompt Title
Company to examine the other warranties. The facts do not
suggest that Title Company or any other party has a defense or
recoupment claim that can be asserted against Home Buyer."
Nor does evidence suggest that the instrument has been altered
in any manner' or that it bears a forged or unauthorized
guage indicates that "remitter" and "issuer" are terms that apply to two different
persons.
190. See § 3-303(b) (defining "consideration").
191. See § 3-416(a) ("A person who transfers an instrument for consideration war-
rants to the transferee .. . ") (emphasis added).
192. See § 3-416(a)(5); see also § 4-207(a)(5) (same warranty). The commentary ex-
plains the policy for this warranty: "If insolvency proceedings . .. have been institut-
ed against the party who is expected to pay and the transferor knows it, the conceal-
ment of that fact amounts to a fraud upon the transferee, and the warranty against
knowledge of such proceedings is provided accordingly." § 3-416 cmt. 4. Transferors
also made this warranty under pre-revised Article 3. See pre-revised § 3-417(2Xe); cf.
NIL § 65(4) (imposing on a negotiating party the warranty that "he has no knowl-
edge of any fact which would impair the validity of the instrument or render it val-
ueless").
193. See § 3-416(a)(4); see also § 4-207(aX5) (same warranty). "he rationale of
[this warranty] is that the transferee does not undertake to buy an instrument that
is not enforceable in whole or in part, unless there is a contrary agreement" § 3-416
cmt. 3; cf. pre-revised § 3-417(2)(d), (3) (warranting "no defense of any party is good
against [the warrantor]," modified by a knowledge qualifier if the warrantor transfers
the instrument "without recourse").
194. See § 3-416(a)(3); see also § 4-207(a)(3) (same warranty); cf pre-revised § 3-
417(2c) (warranting that "the instrument has not been materia!!y altered') (emphasis
added).
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signature.195 At this point, traipsing through section 3-416
seems like an exercise in futility to Title Company.
But wait! There's more!1" When Home Buyer delivered the
check at the closing, Home Buyer warranted to Title Company
that it was a person entitled to enforce the check ' under sec-
tion 3-301. Home Buyer possessed a check payable to the order
of Title Company, rather than a check payable to bearer or the
order of Home Buyer, so Home Buyer was not a holder" and
not a person entitled to enforce the check under section 3-
301(i). Home Buyer was a nonholder who possessed the check,
so Home Buyer was a person entitled to enforce the check un-
der section 3-301(ii) if it enjoyed the rights of a holder through
section 3-203.' Section 3-203(b), which codifies the so-called
"shelter doctrine," states that "[t]ransfer of an instrument...
vests in the transferee any right of the transferor to enforce the
instrument .... .' However, section 3-203(a) indicates that
an instrument is not transferred if the instrument is delivered
by the issuer."' Home Buyer received delivery of the check
from First Bank, the issuer. Therefore, the instrument was not
transferred, section 3-203 is inapplicable, Home Buyer did not
enjoy the rights of a holder, and Home Buyer was not a
person entitled to enforce the check under section 3-301(ii).
Also, because Home Buyer possessed the check, it was not a
person entitled to enforce the check under section 3-301(iii). In
195. See § 3-416(aX2); see also § 4-207(aX2) (same warranty); cf. pre-revised § 3-
417(2)(b) (warranting that "all signatures are genuine or authorized"). The warranties
in pre-revised section 3-417(2Xb) and (c) replaced the warranty in section 65(1) of the
NIL. See NIL § 65(1) (warranting that "the instrument is genuine and in all respects
what it purports to be).
196. With apologies to Johnny Olson and other announcers of game show prizes.
And Mom said watching too much TV would never pay off.
197. See § 3-416(aXl).
198. See § 1-201(20); see also § 3-302, cmt. 4 (Case #1) ("[W]hen Buyer took deliv-
ery of the [cashier's] check [drawn to the order of Seller as payee] from Bank, Buyer
became the owner of the check even though Buyer was not the holder. Buyer was a
remitter.... At that point, nobody was the holder.").
199. See § 3-301 cmt. (TThe phrase 'person entitled to enforcel also includes a
person in possession of an instrument who is not a holder. A nonholder in possession
of an instrument includes a person that acquired rights of a holder by subrogation or
under Section 3-203(a).").
200. § 3-203(b).
201. See § 3-203(a).
202. But see Maggs, supra note 29, at 647-50 (arguing that a remitter should qual-
ify as a nonholder in possession with the rights of a holder).
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summary, Home Buyer was not a person entitled to enforce the
cashier's check when Home Buyer delivered it to Title Compa-
ny.'° Therefore, Home Buyer breached the transfer warranty
in section 3-416(a).' As a result, Title Company may be able
to recover the amount of the dishonored check from Home Buy-
er.=
Title Company would not have this remedy under the trans-
fer warranty provisions of pre-existing commercial law. Home
Buyer did not warrant that it was a person entitled to enforce
the check under either the NIL or pre-revised Article 3. In-
stead, Home Buyer warranted that it had "good title" to the
check.' Neither the NIL nor pre-revised Article 3 defined
"good title."2 7 Most commentary and caselaw, however, limit-
ed the warranty to the presence and genuineness of all nec-
essary indorsements.s Home Buyer would not breach this
203. At least one court has held that a remitter is not entitled to enforce a
cashier's check. See Michaud v. Community Savings Bank, CV 92-0516024S, 1994 WL
146371, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1994) ("Cocopardi is a remitter and Cocopardi had no
right to enforce the instrument as the remitter....").
Although a remitter is not entitled to enforce the check, it should be entitled to
a refund from the issuing bank in certain circumstances. For example, Home Buyer
may refuse to deliver the cashier's check to Title Company if a last-minute problem
prevents a successful dosing. If Home Buyer cannot obtain a refund, First Bank
receives a windfall: payment from Home Buyer for issuing a check that no one can
(or will) enforce. Home Buyer should invoke section 1-103 and argue unjust enrich-
ment. Cf. Hall-Mark Elec. Corp. v. Sims, 179 B.R. 149, 159 (BAP. 9th Cir. 1995)
(noting that an issuing bank would receive a windfall if the purchaser could not
obtain a refund for a cashier's check mistakenly made out to the wrong payee), affd,
108 F.3d 239 (9th Cir. 1997).
204. See § 3-416(a).
205. See § 3-416(b) (permitting a transferee that takes the instrument in good
faith to'recover from the warrantor damages "equal to the loss suffered as a result of
the breach, but not more than the amount of the instrument plus expenses and loss
of interest incurred as a result of the breach.").
206. See NIL § 65(2); pro-revised § 3-417(2Xa).
207. The absence of a U.C.C. definition has been noted by more than one court.
See, e.g., Fifth Third Bank of Toledo, NA. v. Dziersk, 12 F.3d 600, 603 (6th Cir.
1993) ("The term 'good title' is not defined directly in the Ohio Revised Code or the
Uniform Commercial Code . . . ."); Bagby v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 491 F.2d 192, 199 (8th Cir. 1974) (noting that the U.C.C. does not define "good
title"); Sun 'n Sand, Inc. v. United Cal. Bank, 148 Cal. Rptr. 329, 339 (Cal. 1978)
(noting that the U.C.C. "fails to define 'good title); North Carolina Natl Bank v.
Hammond, 260 S.E.2d 617, 623 (N.C. 1979) ("The Code is silent as to what 'good
title' means.. . ."). At least one scholar believes that the drafters created "unneces-
sary ambiguity" by adopting the phrase. See White, supra note 12, at 1330.
208. See, e.g., Dziersk, 12 F.3d at 603 ("In determining whether the warranty [of
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warranty because no indorsements appeared or were required
on the check when Home Buyer delivered it to Title Company
since the check was issued payable to the order of Title Compa-
ny.
Did the drafters intend a different result when they replaced
the "good title" warranty with an "enforcement" warranty? Not
according to their official commentary, which states:
good title] has been broken, the court should ask only whether the paper has all
necessary endorsements and whether they are genuine or otherwise effective."); Bagby,
491 F.2d at 199 (relying on Official Comment 3 to pre-revised section 3-417 and Offi-
cial Comment 1 to pre-revised section 4-207 in concluding that "the draftsmen have
made it clear that a good title warranty is a warranty of 'the genuineness of
indorsements-); Hammond, 260 S.E.2d at 623 ('The weight of authority... supports
a specialized construction limiting good title to the apparent validity of the chain of
indorsements."); Sun In Sand, Inc., 148 Cal. Rptr. at 339, 340 (relying on the "weight
of authority among cases and commentators" for holding "that the warranty of good
title of [pre-revised sections 3-417 and 4-207] involves a very limited inquiry- does the
instrument presented contain all necessary indorsements and are such indorsements
genuine or otherwise deemed effective."); 4 HAWKLAND & LAWRENCE, supra note 54, §
3-417:06, at 894 (1994) (noting that the good title warranty is breached "where an
indorsement in the chain of title is unauthorized [and] where an indorsement neces-
sary to the chain of title is missing"); WHITE & SUMMES, supra note 45, § 15-9, at
772 ("In nine-tenths of the cases that lawyers will see, 'good title' will mean no more
than this check bears no forged indorsements.'); Whaley, supra note 27, at 59 n.39
(1972) ('The warranty of good title refers only to the validity of the chain of neces-
sary indorsements . . . "); id. at 59-60 (citing Official Comment 3 to pre-revised sec-
tion 3-417 for the proposition that "a good title warranty is a warranty of the 'genu-
ineness of indorsementsm); cf. Birmingham Trust Natl Bank v. Central Bank & Trust
Co., 275 So.2d 148, 151 (Ala. Civ. App. 1973) (holding that the statutory warranty of
good title "codifies the theory of implied warranty of the genuineness of prior en-
dorsements which was the accepted general rule ... prior to the Uniform Commer-
cial Code"); Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Hampton State Bank, 497 S.W.2d 80, 84 (Tex.
App. 1973) ("A warranty of title is nothing more than an assurance that no one has
better title to the check than the warrantor, and therefore, that no one is in a posi-
tion to claim title as against the warrantee, as the payee or other owner of a genu-
ine check could do if his endorsement were forged.").
Pre-revised Article 3 codified the warranty of good title in sections 3-417(lXa)
and 3-417(2Xa). The substance of the warranty of good title (but not necessarily the
identity of the warrantor and the warrantee) is the same in both provisions. The
same is true for the warranty of good title found in pre-revised sections 4-207(lXa)
and 4-207(2Xa). As for the relationship between the pre-revised Article 3 warranties
and the pre-revised Article 4 warranties, the commentary states: "Subject to certain
exceptions peculiar to the bank collection process and except that they apply only to
customers and collecting banks, the warranties ... [in pre-revised section 4-207] are
identical in substance with those provided in [pre-revised section 3417. Pre-revised
§ 4-207 cmt. 1. Therefore, the fact that the sources cited in the previous paragraph
do not cite the same statutory provision when discussing the warranty of good title is
irrelevant.
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Subsection (a)(1) ["the warrantor is a person entitled to
enforce the instrument"] is in effect a warranty that there
are no unauthorized or missing indorsements that prevent
the transferor from making the transferee a person entitled
to enforce the instrument.'
Numerous scholars agree.210 Furthermore, if the essence of the
warranty did not change, then neither should the result. In
fact, it seems illogical that the drafters consciously created a
new term of art, "person entitled to enforce," carefully crafted it
in a manner that excludes remitters, and then expected
remitters to be liable for breaching a warranty that they cannot
make. 1' Nevertheless, the hypothetical illustrates that a court
209. § 3-416 cmt. 2; see also § 3-417 cmt. 2 ("Subsection (a)(1) [an enforcement
warranty made at presentment] in effect is a warranty that there are no unautho-
rized or missing indorsements.").
210. See, e.g., CLARK & CLARK, supra note 117, 12.04[1][b], at 12-36 (Although
the terminology shifts from litle' to 'entitlement to enforce the draft,' this change in
terminology should have no substantive impact.L"); HAwKLAND & LAWRENCE, supra
note 54, [Rev] § 3-416:04, at 458 ("Section 3-416(a)(1) is, in effect, a warranty that
there are no unauthorized or missing indorsements that prevent the transferor from
making the transferee a person entitled to enforce the instrument."); JORDAN & WAR-
REN, supra note 95, at 743 ("The § 3-416(aX1) warranty, in practice, serves as a war-
ranty that there are no unauthorized or missing indorsements that prevent the trans-
feror from giving to the transferee the right to enforce the instrument."); LAWRENCE,
supra note 74, at 173 ("A transferor warrants that he is a person entitled to enforce
the instrument. This is basically a warranty that there are no unauthorized or miss-
ing indorsements that prevent the transferee from becoming a person entitled to
enfoice the instrument."); MILLER & HARRELL, supra note 70, 7.02, at 7-14 n.65
("Essentially this is a warranty of good title, that is, no missing or- unauthorized
indorsements, or that the transfer is otherwise rightful."); WHrrs & SUMMERS, supra
note 30, § 18-7, at 234 ("Section 4-208(a) adds clarity in yet another way. The old
Code's section 4-207 contained a warranty that the transferor 'had good title.' But
section 4-208(a) now says that the warrantor is 'a person entitled to enforce the draft
or authorized to obtain payment or acceptance of the draft on behalf of the person
entitled to the draft.' We believe this latter language will be easier to understand, at
least once one understands the identity of a 'person entitled to enforce'. In most cas-
es, this warranty really boils down to the statement 'no forged indorsements here.);
D. Fenton Adams, Problems With the 1990 Revision of Articles 3 and 4 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 15 U. ARK. LXrrE ROCK L. J. 665, 688 (1993) (suggesting
that replacing "good title" with "enforcement" is "a change of dubious merit" but ac-
knowledging that the enforcement warranty "boils down to one of the genuineness of
indorsements").
211. It may appear inconsistent to treat Home Buyer as the owner of the check
until the check is delivered to Title Company, see 3-201 cmt. 2, yet exclude Home
Buyer from the definition of "person entitled to enforce" in section 3-301. What may
appear inconsistent, however, is intended. See § 3-203 cmt. 1 ("The right to enforce
an instrument and ownership of the instrument are two different concepts.... More-
104
1998] REVISIONS TO U.C.C. ARTICLE 3
could impose liability on Home Buyer and other remitters
through methodical statutory analysis. Therefore, to avoid this
unintended result, the enforcement warranty in section 3-
416(aXl) should be revised to read in its entirety as follows:
(1) the warrantor is either a remitter or a person entitled to
enforce the instrument[.]2 2
VI. CONCLUSION
Professor David Meflinkoff once wrote: "Some day someone
will read what you have written, trying to find something
wrong with it. This is the special burden of legal writing, and
the special incentive to be as precise as you can."213 My pur-
over, a person who has an ownership right in an instrument might not be a person
entitled to enforce the instrument"); § 3-301 ("A person may be a person entitled to
enforce the instrument even though the person is not the owner of the instrument or
is in wrongful possession of the instrument."). It also may appear contradictory to
conclude that Home Buyer is not a person entitled to enforce the check under section
3-301, but is a claimant with rights under section 3-312 if the cashier's check is lost,
destroyed, or stolen before Home Buyer delivers the check to Title Company. See § 3-
312(b) (providing a claimant with a claim to the amount of a lost, destroyed, or sto-
len cashier's check, teller's check, or certified check if "(i) the claimant is the drawer
or payee of a certified check or the remitter or payee of a cashier's check or teller's
check") (emphasis added). Again, however, the commentary indicates that the drafters
intended different treatment. See § 3-312 cmt. 1 ("Moreover, Section 3-309 applies
only to a person entitled to enforce the check. It does not apply to a remitter of a
cashier's check or teller's check or to the drawer of a certified check. Section 3-312
applies to both."). Because section 3-312 provides only conditional relief and permits
the claimant to recover only the amount of the check, rather than the amount paid
for it, Home Buyer probably would prefer to be a "person entitled to enforce" rather
than a mere "claimant." See Maggs, supra note 29, at 645-46.
212. The enforcement warranty in sections 3-417(aXl), 3-417(dXl), 4-207(aX1), 4-
208(aXl), and 4-208(d) should be revised in the same or similar manner. In many
remitter transactions, the warranties in sections 3-417(a) and 4-208(a) are irrelevant.
Those presentment warranties are made only if the instrument presented for payment
or acceptance is an "unaccepted draft." Most remitter transactions probably involve a
cashier's check. See § 3-201 cmt. 2; Maggs, supra note 29, at 630 ("ENlearly all mod-
em remitter cases involve cashier's checks."). A cashier's check becomes an accepted
draft when it is issued. See supra note 173. A remitter, however, could purchase a
teller's check (defined at section 3-104(h)), which is not accepted at issuance. In those
situations, the presentment warranties in sections 3-417(a) and 3-208(a) would be
triggered.
213. DAvID MELLINKOFF, LEGAL WRITING: SENSE & NONSENSE 15 (1982).
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pose in writing this article has not been to "find something
wrong" with Article 3 as much as it has been to suggest a few
ways in which selected statutory provisions could be more "pre-
cise."
Skilled operators probably can successfully maneuver the
Article 3 machine through the troublesome areas I have noted
and reach the proper result. But many users, whether they be
students, lawyers, or judges, are not quite so adept. The intro-
duction to the "owner's manual" states that one of the purposes
and policies of the U.C.C. is to clarify the law governing com-
mercial transactions.214 As the modest repairs will not only
further that goal, but also improve the efficiency of the machine
and the proficiency of its operators, the team of architects,
engineers, and others in charge of the blueprints may find the
suggestions helpful.
214. See § 1-102(2)(a).
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